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Essays On Firm Behavior In India
Ritam Chaurey
The private sector in developing countries plays a key role in job-creation and is central to
economic development and poverty alleviation. Governments around the world use various
policies and regulations targeting firms in an attempt to foster growth. This dissertation
focuses on the interplay between government policies, firm behavior, and labor markets in
India.
In Chapter 1, I study the impact of a location-based tax incentive scheme in India.
Location-based policies that target particular geographic regions are widely used by gov-
ernments, but there have been few rigorous evaluations of their causal impacts especially
in the context of developing countries. Using aggregated and firm-level panel data, I find
large increases in employment, total output, fixed capital, and the number of firms as a
result of the program. These increases are due to both the growth of existing firms as well
as the entry of new firms. There is supporting evidence that the new firms entering the
treated regions are larger and more productive. I find no evidence for relocation of firms or
spillovers in industrial activity between treatment and control areas. Finally, using data from
household surveys, I show that wages of workers rise but find no changes in housing rents
or migration across the treated and control regions. My results therefore suggest that the
policy increased welfare, and I also conclude that the policy was cost-effective. This provides
support for “place-based” policies to correct for regional economic disparities, especially in
settings with low labor mobility.
In the next chapter, I focus on the effects of a place-based policy on informal firms.
The informal sector in India is a major component of economic activity covering more than
80% of the workforce. More often than not, the informal sector is beyond the ambit of tax
authorities, hurting public finances in India. In Chapter 2, I study the impact of the feder-
ally financed location-based tax incentive scheme (studied in Chapter 1) on informal firms
in India. Using a difference-in-differences approach with bordering districts, neighboring
states, and major states as control groups, I find no evidence for increases in employment,
total output, gross value added, and registration status for informal firms on average. How-
ever, separating informal firms into those that do not hire regular workers (Own Account
Manufacturing Enterprises) and those that hire workers (Non-directory manufacturing en-
terprises/Directory Manufacturing Enterprises) reveals heterogeneous effects. I find that the
policy change led to a higher likelihood of registration by NDME/DMEs but no effect on
OAMEs. The policy change did not impact the size of these different kinds of firms. This
chapter provides suggestive evidence that tax-exemption schemes can be a useful policy tool
to incentivize informal firms to register.
In Chapter 3, I revisit the contentious labor laws in India and their effects on hiring
decisions of firms faced with demand shocks. Labor regulations in India differ by states and
apply differently across types of laborers. The most restrictive laws make it harder to fire
permanent workers for firms. However, these laws do not apply to workers hired through
contractors (contract workers). Using firm-level data from India, I find that compared to
firms in flexible labor regulations, those in more restrictive labor regimes hire more contract
workers as a response to transitory local demand shocks. I find no differential response in
hiring of permanent workers by firms faced with these shocks. This suggests that firms cir-
cumvent labor laws by hiring workers indirectly through contractors in the face of economic
fluctuations.
Table of Contents
List of Figures iii
Acknowledgements v
1 Location-Based Tax Incentives: Evidence from India 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Background and Policy Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5.1 State-industry results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5.2 Firm-level results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5.3 Synthetic Control Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5.4 Productivity results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5.5 Wages, Rents, and Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2 Place-Based Policies and Informal Firms 64
i
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.2 New Industrial Policy for Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh . . . . . . . . 69
2.3 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3 Labor Regulations and Contract Labor Use: Evidence from Indian Firms 92
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.2 Labor Laws in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.6 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Bibliography 125
Appendices 133
Appendix A Chapter 1 134
Appendix B Chapter 2 143
ii
List of Figures
1.1 Map of India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.2 Trends in employment and number of factories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.3 Trends in total output and fixed capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.4 Estimated coefficient graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.5 Trends in operational factories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.6 Kernel density of Log (employed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
1.7 Kernel density of Log (total output) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.8 Kernel density of Log (fixed capital) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.9 Kernel density of Log (TFP-Levinsohn-Petrin) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.10 Synthetic Control Method - employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.11 Synthetic Control Method - total factories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.12 Synthetic Control Method - total output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.13 Synthetic Control Method - fixed capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.1 Map of India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.2 Employment distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.3 GVA distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.4 Output distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
iii
3.1 Share of contract workers across labor regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.2 Industrial distribution across labor regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
iv
Acknowledgements
I am extremely grateful to Eric Verhoogen for his guidance and help throughout the Ph.D.
His high research standards have pushed me to constantly strive to improve the quality of my
work. I am immensely thankful to Suresh Naidu and Amit Khandelwal for their support and
encouragement all along. I am also very grateful to Rajeev Dehejia, Cristian Pop-Eleches,
and Prajit Dutta for always giving me time to discuss my research, progress, and Ph.D. life
in general. My research benefited greatly because of insightful comments and discussions
with Francois Gerard, Jonas Hjort, Rana Hasan, Supreet Kaur, and Miguel Urquiola. I
would also like to thank the Program for Economic Research (PER) and the Development
Colloquium at Columbia for helping me with the funding for my research.
Writing this dissertation was mostly a result of thinking aloud and talking to friends and
colleagues over the years. I owe a lot to all the conversations over coffee, drinks, lunches,
dinners, movies, and phone calls to Anukriti, Ama Baafra Abeberese, David Blakeslee,
Chris Boone, Prabhat Barnwal, Anupam Bhatnagar, Tirthankar Chakravarty, Kunjal Desai,
Jonathan Dingel, Siddharth Kothari, Tao Li, David Munroe, Nikhil Patel, Rashmi Sahni,
Claire Saint-Donat, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, Arup Sen, and Hyelim Son.
Finally, I would like to thank my family for being the pillar of support throughout. I
owe my deepest gratitude to my parents, whose zest for life and work continues to inspire











Many countries in the world have massive economic disparities across regions. To reduce
these regional inequalities, state and local governments often use “location-based” policies
that seek to generate employment and productivity in particular regions.1 These policies
include tax exemptions, subsidies, land grants, and other infrastructural benefits to firms in
order to incentivize them to locate to disadvantaged regions.2 The benefits and distortions
caused by these policies have long been debated by economists.3 Whether such spatially
targeted policies are able to generate economic gains in a cost-effective manner is largely an
empirical question.
The empirical evaluation of location-based policies is complicated because they have both
direct effects (on employment and output) and indirect effects (on local prices). Detailed
micro data on firms, workers, migration, and local prices is needed in order to quantify their
overall effects, and such data is often not available. This may partly explain the lack of
empirical work assessing spatially targeted policies, especially in developing countries. I fill
this gap in the literature by studying a place-based policy in India. Specifically, I examine
the federally financed New Industrial Policy for the states of Uttarakhand and Himachal
Pradesh. This policy provided tax exemptions and capital subsidies for new and existing
firms starting in 2003, with the primary aim of inducing industrialization and generating
employment in the two states.
The causal effect of the 2003 policy is identified using difference-in-differences (DID) and
1I use the terms location-based policies and place-based policies interchangeably.
2Some examples include Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Zones in the United States, Zones Franches
Urbaines (ZFU) in France and Regional Selective Assistance in the United Kingdom.
3Theoretical arguments can be found in Glaeser (2001), Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008), Moretti (2011), and
Kline and Moretti (2013b).
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synthetic control methods [Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010)]. To estimate the
treatment effect on industrial outcomes such as employment, output, wage bill, and fixed
capital, I use an aggregated state-industry level dataset and a firm-level panel dataset. This
allows me to look at the entry of new firms and the growth of existing firms. I use several
different comparison groups, with varying levels of stringency, to ensure robustness in the
identification strategy. I show that the treated and control states follow similar trends prior
to the policy change, which supports the credibility of the difference-in-differences estimator.
First, I use all major states of India as the control group. To ensure that some unobserved
shock to one region of the country is not driving the results, I then compare the treated
states only to neighboring states. The strictest empirical specifications compare only those
firms that are located in districts lying on the border between treated and control states.
These districts are quite similar in terms of observable characteristics and this specification
provides a strict check on the other specifications. Finally, synthetic control methods employ
a weighted average of all available control states as a counterfactual for the treated states.
All results are robust to these different control groups.
The main results are as follows. At the aggregate state-industry level, I find large in-
creases in employment (37 percent), number of factories (27 percent), total output (57 per-
cent), fixed capital (72 percent), and industrial wage bill (39 percent) in treatment states
relative to control states. These results provide an estimate for the combined effect of entry
of new firms and growth of existing firms as a result of the policy change. The differential
impact of the policy on existing firms in the treated areas compared to the control areas
is given by the firm-level results. These results show that on average, existing firms in the
treated areas increased employment (7.5 - 11 percent), output (8.7 - 18 percent), and made
additions to plant and machinery (25 - 28 percent) as compared to firms in control states.
Although the DID regressions show a differential effect of the policy on various outcomes,
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one concern is that the effects maybe driven by spillovers from the treated to the control
regions. If the policy simply causes economic activity to relocate4 from the control to the
treated areas, then the estimated treatment effect might overstate the aggregate effect of the
policy. Alternately, there could be positive spillovers due to agglomeration economies on the
nearby control areas that might lead us to underestimate the effect of the policy change.
I test for these channels explicitly by taking the following steps. First, I run difference-
in-differences specifications comparing the neighboring states and districts to regions located
even further away from the actual treated group (Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) based
on the assumption that spillovers are likely to be stronger in regions located closer to the
treated states. I find no differential outcomes in neighboring states and bordering districts
compared to those located further away.5 Second, I test for differential firm closures across
treated and control states and find no statistically significant difference. Finally, I also rule
out that the overall results are being driven by multi-establishment firms reallocating pro-
duction across plants to take advantage of the tax exemptions.6
One economic justification for providing tax incentives to attract new firms is the possi-
bility of agglomeration economies on the existing firms in the locality [Greenstone, Hornbeck,
and Moretti (2010), Kline and Moretti (2013a), Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008)]. If more pro-
ductive firms enter a location, there might be positive spillovers on existing plants, leading
4Place-based policies have often been criticized for simply relocating economic activity across different
locations without actually increasing aggregate output [Kline and Moretti (2013a), Glaeser and Gottlieb
(2008), Mayer, Mayneris, and Py (2012)].
5This is in contrast to Givord, Rathelot, and Sillard (2013), who find evidence for negative spillovers from
treated to neighboring control areas in French ZFUs.
6Removing multi-establishment plants from the sample does not change the magnitudes of the treatment
effects.
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to overall growth.7 I find that the policy change attracted larger and more productive plants
to enter the treated areas. However, I do not find any differential effect on TFP (total
factor productivity) for existing plants. One possible explanation for the lack of produc-
tivity spillovers could be that the existing firms take time to internalize the agglomeration
economies generated by new plants. This paper however, only studies the short-term firm-
level responses on productivity and hence might be unable to find evidence for such spillovers.
Having estimated the reduced form effects of the policy on industrial outcomes, I then
analyze the impact on the local population. This is often complicated because place-based
policies have general equilibrium effects. For instance, if workers are mobile, tax incentives
for firms to locate to a particular region might be ineffective in raising real wages of resi-
dents. The increase in labor demand by firms and the consequent rise in nominal wages for
residents might be partially or even completely offset by increases in housing rents and costs
of living as new workers move into the area [Roback (1982), Moretti (2011)]. Hence, in order
to get an estimate of the effects of the policy change on the local population, I combine data
on wages and expenditures from household surveys with data on rents and migration. I find
that nominal wages and monthly per capita expenditure differentially increase but housing
rents remain unchanged in treated states after the policy change. Since the policy change
might have affected other local prices instead of housing rents, I adjust the nominal wages
and per capita expenditure measures using a state-level price deflator. I document that
real wages and real expenditure per capita also increase (12 percent and 10 percent respec-
tively) differentially in the treated areas. Theoretically, this is consistent with low mobility
of workers across regions as the increase in nominal wages following a labor demand shock
is not offset by increases in the cost of living due to entry of new workers. I explicitly test
7For example, when the elasticity of agglomeration with respect to economic density in the receiving
region is higher, reallocating economic activity from one region to another leads to a long run increase in
output [Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008)].
6
for differential migration and find no statistically significant difference between the treated
and control states. The results on low migration in India are also consistent with previous
literature.8
Finally, I assess the costs and benefits of this location-based tax incentive scheme. Since
there is no official government estimate on the effectiveness of the policy, I conduct a back-
of-the-envelope quantitative assessment using the estimates from the paper. I find that the
policy resulted in approximately 30,000 jobs, between 500-600 new firms, and around 7.8
billion Rupees in industrial wages in 2007-08 (the last year in the data set). I conclude
that the policy was cost-effective as the gains in profits for firms and the total wage bill for
workers in the treated states outweigh my estimates of the costs (including both actual costs
of subsidies and foregone tax revenues).9 My estimates suggest a gain of 0.5 percent of the
GDP (in 2007-08) in the two states relative to what would have happened in the absence of
it.
Prior empirical work evaluating place-based policies has primarily focused on developed
countries, mostly in the United States and Europe. In the United States, the focus has
been on Federal Empowerment Zones (EZ) and State Enterprise Zones (ENTZ); these are
neighborhoods receiving tax breaks and job subsidies. The results on the efficacy of these
zones in creating jobs have been mixed.10 Other recent papers on place-based policies have
studied programs in European countries. These include the “Regional Selective Assistance”
8See Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009), Topalova (2010), and Hnatkovska and Lahiri (2013).
9The deadweight loss in this setting where workers are not very mobile will be low and most of the benefits
will accrue to local workers. [Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013)].
10Neumark and Kolko (2010), Greenbaum and Engberg (2004), and Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007)
find no effects of enterprise zones on employment growth. However, Ham, Swenson, Imrohoroglu, and Song
(2011) find positive effects for EZs, ENTZs, and Federal Enterprise Communities. Busso, Gregory, and
Kline (2013) also find that the EZ program increased employment and wages inside the zones at moderate
efficiency costs.
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in the United Kingdom [Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and van Reenen (2012)], the French
ZFUs [Mayer, Mayneris, and Py (2012), Givord, Rathelot, and Sillard (2013)] and Italy’s
Law 488/1992 [Bronzini and de Blasio (2006)]. My paper contributes to this growing liter-
ature by rigorously evaluating the incidence and welfare impacts of a location-based policy
in a developing country. Wang (2013) is the only other paper in a developing country and
studies the impact of Chinese SEZs on municipality level outcomes such as foreign direct
investment, agglomeration and local prices.11 I extend this relatively new literature study-
ing location-based policies in developing countries by conducting an overall assessment of
the policy change using a comprehensive set of outcomes (both detailed industrial- and
household-level). I also carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the policy using my estimates
and add to the small recent literature on local labor markets that studies the overall costs
and benefits of place-based policies [Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013), Kline and Moretti
(2013a)].
This paper also contributes to the literature on firms’ location decisions in response to
tax differentials. Duranton, Gobillon, and Overman (2011) find a negative impact of local
taxes on firm employment but no impact on firm entry in the United Kingdom. Rathelot
and Sillard (2008) look at French micro data and find a weak response of firms’ location
decisions to higher taxes. In contrast, I document a large increase in the entry of firms as a
result of the tax exemptions.
The results of this paper, thus, inform policy-makers about the efficacy of tax benefits for
industrializing backward regions. In this context, I observe large responses of firms to tax
benefits, but very little migration response by individuals. This suggests that it might be
11The analysis in Wang (2013) is restricted as detailed firm-level data is not available to study the dynamics
of new and old firms. Furthermore, the paper cannot directly test for migration and only alludes to low
worker mobility because nominal wages rise faster than cost of living. A quantitative cost-benefit analysis is
also not possible due to data constraints.
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easier to provide incentives for firms to move to a particular location than to move people.
Especially in settings with low labor mobility, such spatially targeted policies could be a
cost-effective way to generate employment, output, and real earnings gains for workers.12
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the background for the
study and the details of the policy. Section 1.3 discusses the empirical strategy, Section 1.4
describes the data, and the results are discussed in Section 1.5. Finally, Section 1.6 conducts
a cost-benefit analysis and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Background and Policy Details
Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand are two states in the north of India (see Figure 1.1). In
November 2000, the northwestern districts of Uttar Pradesh were split off to form the state
of Uttarakhand. After the formation of Uttarakhand, it was placed in the list of “special cat-
egory” states13 that included Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh,
Assam, Sikkim, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura.
Both Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh are two of the smaller states in India, together
covering roughly 3.5% of India’s total area. They are predominantly covered by hilly areas
and forests.14 According to the 2001 Census, the total population of Himachal Pradesh and
Uttarakhand was around 6.1 million and 8.5 million respectively (around 1.4% of India’s to-
tal population). Industrialization was considered a policy challenge in the two states, owing
12Kline and Moretti (2013b) also note that “..in the idealized model..the most efficient demand side subsidy
was one that yielded no mobility response at all and simply raised local wages.”
13These areas have hilly and difficult terrain, very low level of infrastructural development and significant
tribal population. Almost all of them are border states with considerable international borders. These states
get preferential treatment in federal assistance.
14According to India State of Forest Report, 2011, forest area covered 66.5% of the area of Himachal
Pradesh and 64.8% of the area in Uttarakhand.
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to the topography. For instance, in 2000, the two states together accounted for less than
1% of the number of factories and industrial output in India. Beginning 2003, the Govern-
ment of India (central government), in order to attract industrial investments and generate
employment in the states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, decided to provide the
following incentive package.
I. New industrial units and existing industrial units on their substantial expansion (in-
crease by at least 25% in the value of fixed capital investment in plant and machinery of an
industrial unit for the purpose of expansion of capacity/modernization and diversification)
set up in ‘designated’ industrial estates/growth centers were entitled to:
(a) 100% excise duty exemption for a period of 10 years from the date of commencement
of commercial production
(b) 100% income tax exemption for an initial period of five years and thereafter 30% for
companies and 25% for others for a further period of five years
(c) all new firms and existing units (upon substantial expansion) in the notified locations
would be eligible for capital investment subsidy equaling 15% of their investment in plant
and machinery, subject to a ceiling of Rs. 3 million (approximately USD 50,000).
II. A list of ‘thrust sector’ industries was compiled that would be eligible for the benefits
listed above irrespective of whether they located in an industrial estate or not.
These tax exemptions pertained to the taxes collected by the central government. In
general, companies resident in India are taxed on their worldwide income arising from all
sources at corporate income tax rates between 30% (for domestic corporations) and 40%
(for foreign corporations). Central excise duty rates varied between 8%-16%. These tax
exemptions were large enough to incentivize firms to enter the states.
Importantly, a few months after the policy (in June 2003) was initiated, the Government
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of India issued a notification15 designating the areas in the two states where industrial units
would be eligible to get these tax incentives. The notification included (i) Existing Industrial
Estates (ii) Proposed Industrial Estates (iii) Industrial Activity in Non-industrial Area and
(iv) Expansion of Existing Industrial Estates. This notification made almost all of the
existing industrial activity prior to 2003 and surrounding areas eligible for the benefits.
This in practice, blurred the differential treatment accorded to the thrust sector industries,
because there was virtually no area (where industrial activity was possible) in the two states
where the policy would not be applicable.
The central excise tax exemption was removed on 31st March 2010, and the income tax
exemption was removed on the 31st of March 2012. Essentially, any new industrial units
set up or existing units undertaking substantial expansion in these states prior to the above
dates would continue to be eligible for these benefits.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
In this paper, I empirically test whether the centrally sponsored location-specific tax incen-
tives led to differential increases in industrial outcomes in the treated areas as compared
to control areas. The empirical strategy uses the 2003 policy change that provided tax
incentives to firms in the two states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh in a difference-
in-differences setup. I use this state-year variation to compare outcomes before and after
the policy change (2003) in the treated areas to a set of control units. To the best of my
knowledge, no other policy was implemented in these two states beginning 2003 that affected
industrial outcomes, and this helps me to identify the treatment effect of the particular tax




Ideally we would like to compare the treated states to an observationally similar control
group. I consider a few different control groups for the analysis. I compare industrial out-
comes in the treated states to a set of neighboring states and then to all major states taken
together. The most stringent specification compares outcomes of firms in districts located
on either side of the borders in the treated and control areas. This is a strict test on the
identification, as districts on either side of the border tend to be more similar as compared
to geographically distant locations. Finally, I also perform robustness checks using the syn-
thetic control method where the control group is formed using a weighted average of all the
non-treated states in order to best match the treated states. For all outcome variables, the
synthetic control group comprises states both near and away from the treated states.
Indian firm-level data sets do not provide exact location identifiers (to the level of street
address and zip codes) below the district level. Since each district in the two treated states
had at least one designated area that was eligible for the incentives, an empirical strategy
comparing firms or industries across districts within the treated states would not be pos-
sible.16 Following visits to the respective state industry departments, it became clear that
the notification brought almost all existing industrial activity within the ambit of the policy
change and also added new areas. Therefore, unlike Mayer, Mayneris, and Py (2012), the
closing down of existing firms in ineligible areas to re-open in an eligible industrial area
within the state is not a concern here.
It is thus reasonable to consider this policy as affecting the entire states of Himachal
Pradesh and Uttarakhand. In this paper, it will not be possible to separate out the effects
of the tax incentives from the capital subsidy provided.
16I use the terms industrial estate and designated area interchangeably because many non-industrial areas
with existing industrial activity prior to 2003 were included as eligible areas for the policy through Notification
50/2003.
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Before looking at regression specifications, Figures 1.2 and 1.3 plot the raw data over
time for the variables of interest at the state-industry level. These plots show that the pre-
2003 trends in employment, number of factories, total output, and fixed capital were similar
across the treated and control states, only diverging after 2003. The pre-treatment trends
look parallel and provide visual support to the use of difference-in-differences (DID) strategy
in this context to estimate the causal effect of the policy change.17
I run two main types of regressions (DID specifications) to estimate the treatment ef-
fect of the policy change on industrial outcomes. First, I run state×3-digit industry level
regressions of the form:
ysjt = δs + λjt + β(postt × treats) + γ(Xst) + εsjt (1.1)
where s,j,t indexes state, 3-digit industry, and time respectively, ysjt represents an out-
come variable such as employment, number of factories, total output, fixed capital, or in-
dustrial wage bill that varies at the state, industry, and year level, δs represents state fixed
effects, λjt represents industry-year fixed effects and Xst represents time varying controls.
18
The coefficient β, on the interaction term postt × treats, where
postt =
 1 if year is 2003 or after0 if year is pre 2003
treats =
 1 if state is Uttarakhand or Himachal Pradesh0 otherwise (control states),
17The trends look similar even on adding all states. To be visually clear, these graphs only show the trends
in the nearby states.
18Note that in all state-industry regressions, the control group is either neighboring states or all major
states. District identifiers are not available in this dataset.
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is then the causal effect of the policy change. I include pre-treatment state-level variables
from the 2001 Census such as population, number of industrial and agricultural workers etc.
in the state and interact them with a time dummy for each year as control variables.19 The
regressions with employment, output, wage bill, and fixed capital therefore combine both the
extensive (entry and exit of firms) and intensive margin (growth by existing firms) of the pol-
icy change. The regression with number of factories as the regressand gives us the extensive
margin directly and is a cumulative effect that takes into account both entry and exit of firms.
The next set of regressions are at the firm-level :
yidjt = αi + λjt + β(postt × treatd) + γ(Xidjt) + εidjt (1.2)
where i,d,j,t indexes firm, state or district (depending on choice of control group),20 4-
digit industry and time respectively, and yidjt represents a firm-level outcome variable such
as employment, output, fixed capital, additions to fixed capital, additions to plant and ma-
chinery, or wage bill. I also use age and age-squared as controls in the regressions.21 Note
that the inclusion of firm fixed effects removes the effect of new firms entering after 2003.
Hence, this regression looks at the impact of the policy change on the outcome measures
only for incumbent firms and can be interpreted as the intensive margin of the policy change.
While the DID regressions estimate the differential effect of the policy between the treat-
ment and control areas, it is conceivable that the results are being affected by changes caused
19These regressions are similar to the area level employment and number of plants regressions in Criscuolo,
Martin, Overman, and van Reenen (2012).
20For the firm-level data, district identifiers are available and thus the control groups include neighboring
states or bordering districts.
21Since a particular firm does not change location in the dataset, the firm fixed effect subsumes the state
or district fixed effects.
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by the policy in the control areas. For example, relocation of firms from the control states to
the treated states might lead us to wrongfully attribute the observed effects as being caused
by the policy change. To check whether firms close down in control states to reopen in the
treated states, I take three approaches. First, I look at trends in the number of operational
factories in the treated states and the neighboring control states. Then, I run a regression
at the state-industry level with the number of closed firms22 as the dependent variable to
look at the differential impact on firm closures across the treated and control states, before
and after the policy change.23 Finally, I run regressions comparing the impact of the policy
change in neighboring states to states further away from the treated states. The underly-
ing assumption is that firms closer to the treatment states would be more likely to relocate
production into those states in response to the policy. If there is substantial relocation, we
would expect to see lower industrial activity in neighboring control states relative to states
that are further away from the treated areas. Rather than closing down an existing plant in
a control area and reopening in the treated states, a multi-establishment firm might move
production between its various plants to take advantage of the tax benefits. To rule this out,
I also run regressions that omit multi-establishment firms.
A related concern might be that the policy induces spillovers in the nearby control areas.
Positive spillovers in industrial activity from the treated states to the neighboring control
states would lead us to underestimate the effect of the policy change. Such externalities
might be substantial, especially in control districts bordering the treated districts, and may
lead to a differential response on firms in districts nearer to the treated states relative to
those further away. To check whether the firm-level results are being influenced by spillovers,
22I define the number of closed firms as the difference between the total number of firms and the number
of operational firms.
23If firms are relocating to the treated states, we would expect to see a larger number of firm closures in
the control states as compared to the treated states.
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I run a regression specification comparing the firms along the border in the treated states to
those in districts further away from the border in the control states (essentially omitting the
bordering control districts from the regression). I also run a specification to see the effect
of the policy change on firms in bordering control districts compared to firms in districts
further away in the control states.
Finally, to look at the effects of the policy on wages, rents, and migration, I run regres-
sions of the form:
ykdst = δd + λt + β(postt × treats) + γ(Xkdst) + εkdst (1.3)
where k,d,s,t indexes household or individual, district, state and time respectively. ykdst
represents wages or migration status in the individual-level regressions and rents or monthly
per capita expenditure in the household-level regressions. For the individual-level regressions,
I control for age, sex, marital status, education status, and the industry of work. The
regressions with housing rents use attributes of the house as controls, such as roof type,
dwelling type, floor, number of rooms, and area.
1.4 Data
I combine data from multiple sources to evaluate the impact of the policy change. For
industrial outcomes, I use two datasets: (i) the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) state×3-
digit industry panel (from 1999-2000 to 2007-08) and (ii) ASI firm-level panel (1999-2000 to
2007-08). To study the effects on individual and household outcomes, I use (a) Employment-
Unemployment rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS) for the years 1999-2000, 2004-
05, 2005-06 and 2007-08 and (b) Housing Conditions rounds of the NSS for the years 2002
and 2008.
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The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), conducted by the Ministry of Statistics and
Program Implementation (MoSPI), is the main source of industrial statistics in India. The
ASI covers the entire Factory Sector comprising industrial units (called factories) registered
under the Sections 2(m)(i) and 2(m)(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948. This includes all firms
employing 10 or more workers using power and 20 or more workers without the use of
power. Geographically, it covers the entire country except the states of Arunachal Pradesh,
Mizoram, and Sikkim, and Union Territory of Lakshadweep for the surveys. The ASI dataset
is well-suited to answer this question as it covers formal sector firms that are affected by tax
changes.
For the state-industry level regressions, I use the ASI state×3-digit industry panel. Each
observation is at the state-industry-year level. Industries are classified at the 3-digit National
Industrial Classification (NIC) codes. This data set includes 65 industries (3-digit NIC), 9
years (1999-2000 to 2007-08) and all major states. Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for
the variables of interest at the state×3-digit industry level. As Table 1.1 shows, the two
treated states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand had smaller industrial employment,
number of factories, total output, fixed capital, and wage bill as compared to neighboring
states or the rest of India before 2003. For example, average employment size in a 3-digit
industry before 2003 in the treated states was 590 as compared to the figures for neighboring
states (3154) or all the major states together (4952). Post-2003, the average size of industrial
employment goes up throughout India, but the increase is highest in the treated states.
Similar increases can be seen for number of factories, total output, and fixed capital after
2003 in the treated states as compared to other states. Mean total output and fixed capital
at the state industry level rises almost three-folds in the treated states after 2003, much
larger than the increase in the other states.
For the firm-level regressions, I use the ASI firm-level panel for the years 1999-2000 to
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2007-08. The ASI frame is divided into census (surveyed every year) and sample (sampled
every few years) sectors. However, the definition of the two sectors has changed from time
to time. Five industrially backward states24 are always covered in the census sector. For the
rest of India, the definition of the census sector has changed from 200 or more employees
(1998-2000) to 100 or more employees (2001 onwards). To take into account the changes
in the sampling frame, I run firm-level regressions using the sampling weights provided by
ASI. I restrict the sample to the major states and union territories of India as covered by
the ASI.25
“Firm” in this context means a factory, the unit of observation in the data set. Table 1.2
shows summary statistics for the different outcome variables at the firm-level broken up by
treated states, neighboring states, and major states for periods before and after the policy
change. I use the sampling weights from the data set to construct the summary statistics
for the estimated population.26 Average employment within the firm increases post 2003,
irrespective of which group we look at. Median employment after 2003 however, increases
by almost 56% for firms in the treated state whereas the increase is negligible for firms in
the rest of the country. Mean output and fixed capital almost double for firms in the treated
group after 2003. This increase is much larger as compared to any other group.
To study the welfare effects of the policy change, I use migration, wages, and house rents
data from the National Sample Survey (NSS). NSS is a nationally representative household
survey in India, also conducted by the MoSPI. Specifically, I use rounds 55 (1999-2000), 61
(2004-05), 62 (2005-06), and 64 (2007-08) of the employment-unemployment surveys of the
24Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura and Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
25I do not include Jammu & Kashmir or the states in the North-east namely Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya,
Nagaland, and Tripura.
26See Harrison, Martin, and Nataraj (2013) and Bollard and Sharma (2013).
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NSS for the wages data. The survey provides information on wages and employment for
each household member over the last seven days before the interview. To study migration, I
use NSS Rounds 55 (1999-2000) and Round 64 (2007-08)27 - one round each before and after
the policy change. The survey elicits information about the last usual place of residence
for the household members. I define an external (internal) migrant as one whose last usual
place of residence was another state or country (same state but another district). To look at
the effect of the policy on rents, I use two NSS rounds of the Housing Conditions schedule
for the years 2002 (round 58) and 2008 (round 65). These rounds include questions on
housing rents and the attributes of the house such as total floor area, kitchen type, floor
type, number of rooms, type of roof, and type of dwelling. Finally, I construct a state-level
GDP deflator using the state GDP at constant and current prices from the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy to deflate nominal values.28
Summary statistics for these NSS data are shown in Table 1.3.
1.5 Results
I begin by reporting the results for the difference-in-differences regressions at the state-
industry level for different outcome variables (Subsection 1.5.1) and then look at the firm-
level results (Subsection 1.5.2). The synthetic control results are reported in subsection 1.5.3.
Subsection 1.5.4 discusses results on productivity and results on wages, rents, and migration
are discussed in subsection 1.5.5.
27Only these two rounds have information on migration for the relevant time frame.
28See Appendix Table A2.
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1.5.1 State-industry results
The state-industry DID regression results are reported in tables 4 through 8. For each of
these tables, Panel A uses neighboring states as the control group and includes Haryana,
Punjab, Delhi, Chandigarh, and Uttar Pradesh. The states of Haryana, Punjab and Uttar
Pradesh border the treated states, whereas Chandigarh and Delhi are the commercial hubs
near the treated states. In Panel B, all the major states of India are included as the control
group. This includes the neighboring states and the states of Rajasthan, Bihar, Andhra
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Goa, Kerala, Karnataka,
Tamil Nadu, Jharkhand, Gujarat, and West Bengal. All the results in this subsection can
be interpreted as the cumulative effect of the growth of existing firms and the entry of new
firms at the state-industry level.
For tables 4 to 8, Column 1 includes state, year, and 3-digit industry fixed effects. State
fixed effects control for time invariant state characteristics like the area and topography of
the state. The year fixed effects control for macroeconomic shocks affecting all states and the
industry fixed effects control for time invariant industry characteristics. Column 2 is a more
flexible specification as it includes industry-year fixed effects which control for time varying
industry characteristics. This is important because some industries like pharmaceuticals and
IT (information technology) have grown in India over the last decade, and the industry-year
fixed effects controls for these changes.29 Column 3 adds time varying controls at the state
level to the specification in Column 1. I include pre-2003 state-level variables from the 2001
Census such as population, agricultural, and industrial workers etc. and interact them with a
time dummy for each year as control variables. Column 4 includes the specification of Column
29A related concern might be that the industrial composition in the treated states is different than the
control states and to control for this, I run regressions controlling for state×industry fixed effects. These
results are shown in Table A8 in the Appendix.
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2 with time varying controls.30 Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. For each
regression, I also report Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) multi-way clustered standard
errors at the state and year level. Since the policy change only affected two states and
number of state clusters are small, inference using standard cluster-robust techniques may
lead to over rejection. As a robustness check, I report the wild cluster bootstrap-t p-values
[Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008)] for the main regressions in Appendix Table A9.31
The results remain significant on using the bootstrapped p-values.
The dependent variable in Table 1.4 is the log of employment at the 3-digit industry
level. In columns 1 to 4, the coefficient of interest on the interaction post*treat is positive
and significant at the 1% level. Mean employment at the industry level differentially increases
in the treated states relative to the control states by around 37% - 42% (Panel A). In Panel B,
I run the same specifications with all major states as the comparison group. The coefficient
of interest in Panel B is between 43% and 45%. The magnitudes of the treatment effect
are similar and do not depend on the choice of the control group. This translates into
approximately 30,000 additional jobs in the treated states in 2007-08 (the last year in the
dataset) compared to what would have happened in the absence of the policy.
Table 1.5 looks at the same specifications for log of total number of factories as the
dependent variable. In this table, the coefficient on post*treat can be interpreted as the
extensive margin of the policy change as it takes into account new entry by firms as a result
of the policy change. Columns 1 through 4, Panel A, show that the effect of the policy change
on the average number of factories in an industry (in treated states relative to control states)
is between 27% and 29%. The corresponding estimates from Panel B show a 31% increase
30I also run regressions controlling for yearly state-level GDP. All results are robust to adding this control
variable.
31Also see Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013).
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in the average number of factories. Table 1.5 confirms that the policy change led to a large
differential increase in the number of new firms coming in to the treated states relative to
control states. These estimates translate into a total additional increase of around 550 firms
in the treated states in 2007-08.
Table 1.6 reports the results for log of total output at the state-industry level. The
effect of the policy change on total output (in treated states relative to control states) is
even larger than the effect on total employment, ranging between 58% and 64%. Results
for log of fixed capital are shown in Table 1.7. The results show an increase of 87% in
fixed capital and part of this can be attributed to the “substantial expansion” clause where
existing firms needed to increase their investment of fixed capital by at least 25% to receive
the tax exemptions. Furthermore, capital investment subsidies were also provided in these
two states after 2003 to both new and existing firms, contributing to the massive increase in
fixed capital at the industry level. Finally in Table 1.8, I show that the industrial wage bill
differentially increases by 40% in the treated states as compared to the control states.
The estimated coefficients over time along with standard errors at the 95% confidence
level are plotted in Figure 1.4. These coefficients are obtained from a regression of the
outcome variable (log employment, log factories, log output, and log fixed capital) on the
interaction between treat (indicator variable for treated states) and time dummies after
controlling for state, year, and industry fixed effects. These graphs visually show that before
2003, there were no trends in the outcomes and the effects only show up after 2003. These
graphs also provide visual evidence for the treatment effect of the policy change and show
that the effect increases every year after 2003.
There may be some concern that firms close down in the neighboring control states to
reopen in the treated states to take advantage of the tax incentives. To check for this, I take
the following steps. First, I plot the number of operational factories in the treated states and
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the neighboring control states. If the policy change in 2003 caused factories to close down
in the neighboring control states and reopen in the treated states, there should be a decline
in the number of operational factories in the neighboring states. Figure 1.5 plots the trends
in operational factories and there is no evidence that more factories closed down in control
states compared to treated states. To check for differential closure of firms across treated and
control states, I run difference-in-difference specifications with the number of firm closures as
the dependent variable in Table 1.9. I find no differential response in terms of firm closures
across the treated and control states. In Table 1.10, I run regressions similar to placebo
checks. I remove the treated states from the sample and run regressions assuming that the
neighboring states got treated by the policy change. The underlying assumption is that
the relocation of factories, workers, and capital is easier from nearby places as compared
to regions further away from the treated states. Hence, the policy change should have
differentially impacted neighboring states as opposed to states further away from the treated
states. The results in Table 1.10 compare outcomes in the neighboring states to other major
states before and after the policy change. There is no statistically significant systematic
difference in the outcomes between the neighbors and all other states.32 Overall, there is no
evidence of differential closure of firms or relocation of industrial activity across the treated
and control states.
However, firms in control states might re-direct capital and produce output across their
different plants to take advantage of these tax incentives without closing down. To rule out
this channel completely, I would need to check whether multi-establishment firms are driving
the results. I discuss this issue along with the firm-level results next.
32Employment is marginally significant at the 10% level but has the opposite sign to what we would expect.
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1.5.2 Firm-level results
Firm-level regressions are reported in Table 1.11. I restrict the sample to open firms. Dif-
ferent rows show the results for the various outcomes of interest. All columns, 1 through 4,
include firm, year, and 4-digit industry fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 also control for 4-
digit industry-year fixed effects. Firm fixed effects control for any time invariant unobserved
heterogeneity at the firm-level and 4-digit industry-year fixed effects take into account time
varying effects across industries. I also control for age and age-squared in all regressions.
Columns 1 and 2 use firms in the neighboring states as the control group. In columns 3 and
4, I restrict the sample to bordering districts.33 Districts on the border along the treated and
control states tend to be observationally similar, differing only because of differential benefits
provided to firms. In these specifications, I compare outcomes for firms across bordering dis-
tricts (in treated and neighboring control states) before and after the policy change. These
regressions are a strict test on the identification strategy and provide credible support to my
results from using firms in neighboring states as the control group. As mentioned earlier,
these regressions only show the effect of the policy change on existing firms. This is because
the effect of new firms entering after 2003 is removed by the inclusion of firm fixed effects.
In Table 1.11, the coefficients on the interaction term post*treat can be interpreted as the
intensive margin of the policy change as it shows the effect of the policy change on incumbent
firms (firms present both before and after the policy change). Columns 1 and 2 show that the
mean employment for existing firms in the treated states differentially increases by 7-10% as
compared to those in control states. The results in columns 3 and 4 with firms in bordering
districts as the control group also shows a differential increase in mean employment in firms
by around 11%. Total output and wage bill also differentially increase for existing firms
33List of bordering districts is shown in Appendix Table A1.
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in the treated states compared to those in control states. The differential increase in total
output is between 8.7% and 23.7% depending on the choice of the control group. Wage bill
also increases by 8% to 13%.
I also run regressions with fixed capital, additions to fixed capital, and additions to plant
and machinery as outcome variables. Fixed capital includes depreciation whereas additions
to fixed capital and additions to plant and machinery are measures of actual additions
before depreciation. The measure of stock of fixed capital is more likely to suffer from
measurement error than the numbers for actual additions34 made during the year. This is
also clear from the regression results. For example, fixed capital shows an increase of around
7-8% but in most cases is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Actual additions to fixed
capital however, increased by around 28% and additions to plant and machinery increased
by around 26% for existing firms in treated areas compared to control areas. The coefficients
from the bordering districts regressions also have similar magnitudes. These results provide
suggestive evidence that existing firms took advantage of the “substantial expansion” clause
and increased investment on fixed capital to receive the tax benefits. In this respect, these
results confirm that the policy was successful in incentivizing firms to invest more in plant
and machinery.
It is conceivable that the firm-level results are being driven by multi-establishment firms
reallocating production across their various plants to take advantage of the incentives. In
Table 1.12, I directly test for this by removing multi-establishment firms from the sample. I
find similar coefficients using this sample and hence it is unlikely that the firm-level results
are being driven by these establishments. A separate concern in the bordering districts
regressions is the possibility that results are downward biased because of positive spillovers
from treated to control areas. To check for this, I run a regression specification with the firms
34Actual additions are similar to measures of investment.
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along the border in the treated states compared with firms further away from the bordering
districts in the control states. These results are shown in Table 1.13. For existing firms
in the treated districts as compared to control districts, employment went up by 15% and
output by 16% after 2003.35 In Table 1.14, I compare firms in districts in the neighboring
control states that border the treated states to firms in districts further away from the treated
states. I find no differential effects in firm-level outcomes in this regression. The results from
Tables 1.13 and 1.14 taken together, suggest that spillovers do not play a substantial role
in the firm-level results and especially lends support for the bordering districts regression
specification.
To explore differences between new and existing firms, I plot kernel density graphs (figures
1.6 through 1.9) comparing firms across treated and control regions. The graphs clearly
indicate that the new firms entering the treated states are larger and more productive than
both the existing firms (in the treated states) and the new firms entering the neighboring
control states. Since informal firms tend to be smaller in size than formal firms, this is
suggestive evidence that the effects of the policy change are not completely being driven by
informal firms becoming formal. However, it is not possible to say where the new firms come
from and where they might have set up in the absence of the policy.
1.5.3 Synthetic Control Methods
The New Industrial Policy for the states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, provides an
ideal setup to apply the synthetic control method [Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie,
Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010)]. I use the method to find a “synthetic control” group
for the treated states, by using a weighted average of the available “donor pool” (units that
35These magnitudes are a bit larger than those obtained in the firm-level regressions in Table 1.11, sug-
gesting the possibility of a downward bias in the treatment effects.
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are unaffected by the policy), that best matches the value of the predictors of the outcomes
of interest (directly employed, number of factories, total output, and fixed capital) before
2003. This synthetic control group then approximates the trajectory of the outcomes for the
treated units in the counterfactual event that the policy had not been in place. Since the
choice of the control units is data driven, the method is extremely transparent. Following
this, I conduct placebo tests where the synthetic control method is applied to all the control
units in the sample, with the treated unit in the donor pool. The inference is then exact, in
the sense that I look at the ratio of the post-intervention (2003) to pre-intervention mean
squared prediction error (MSPE) from the treated units’ outcome and compare it to the same
ratio for all the placebo runs. This is similar to a permutation test and essentially examines
whether the treatment effect is much larger in the treated states as compared to a randomly
chosen placebo. If the effect is of a similar magnitude in the treated units as compared to
a randomly-chosen placebo, then it is not possible to conclude that the treatment effect is
valid.
First, I aggregate the data from the two treated states into one treated unit,36 and use the
total aggregated numbers over all industries in the state in a year from the ASI state-industry
level panel data. Since I do not include Jammu & Kashmir or the states in the north-east of
India in the ‘donor pool’, there are 23 available control states and union territories to choose
from.
The outcome variables of interest are the number of employed persons, number of facto-
ries, total output, and fixed capital, for all industries together in a state in a given year. As
predictors of the outcome variables at the state level, I include number of males, females,
literacy rate, number of workers, number of main and marginal workers, cultivators, agri-
36The synthetic method works well when there is one treated unit and a number of control units to choose
from.
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cultural laborers, and percentage of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. These variables
are available from the 2001 Census. I also include the lagged values of the outcome variables
in the pre-intervention period (2000-03).
Figure 1.10, Panel A graphically shows the treatment effect of the 2003 policy change on
the number employed in all industries in the states. The solid line shows the trajectory for
the treated states, which is closely matched by the dashed line (synthetic control) in the pre-
intervention phase, only to diverge substantially after 2003. Table A3a in the appendix shows
the weights on the states in the donor pool, that provide a good synthetic control group.
Only Chandigarh, Chhattisgarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Jharkhand, and Rajasthan have
positive weights, with the rest of the states getting zero weights. Both Chandigarh and Dadra
and Nagar Haveli are union territories and the results are unchanged on removing the union
territories from the donor pool. Using logs of the outcome variables also keeps the results
unchanged. Table A3b shows the values for various predictors of the outcome variable for
both the treated and the synthetic control groups. Figure 1.10, Panel B is used to conduct
the inference test. It visually shows the ratio of post-intervention to pre-intervention MSPE
for the treated states and all the placebo runs for states in the donor pool. Clearly, this
ratio is the largest for the treated states. Hence, if the treatment was randomly assigned to
any unit in the sample, the probability of obtaining a ratio as large as in the treated states
would be 1/24 = 0.042. This implies that the differential effect in employment between the
treated and control states is significant at the 5% level.37 Also note that the total treatment
effect in 2007-08 is around 25,000 jobs and is close to the estimates from the regression in
Table 1.4.
Figure 1.11, Panel A shows the synthetic control method graph for the outcome variable -
number of factories in all industries at the state level. Table A4a shows that positive weights
37Note that this is a one-tailed test and the p-value depends on the number of control states.
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have been applied to Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,
and Rajasthan. Results remain unchanged on removing the union territories (Andaman &
Nicobar Islands and Chandigarh). Table A4b shows the mean of the predictors used for
number of factories. I conduct a similar inference test in Figure 1.11, Panel B and plot
the ratio of post-intervention to pre-intervention MSPE. Again, the ratio is largest for the
treated states and hence the probability of obtaining the largest ratio is 1/24 = 0.042. As
in the previous case, the total treatment effect in 2007-08 (around 600 firms) is close to the
estimates from the regressions in Table 1.5.
Finally, Figures 1.12 and 1.13 show the synthetic control method graphs for total output
and fixed capital respectively. For both these outcome variables, the post/pre 2003 MSPE is
the largest for the treated states and hence the p-value is 1/24 = 0.042. Hence, the treatment
effect is significant at the 5% level for all outcomes of interest.
1.5.4 Productivity results
A major economic rationale for providing tax incentives to firms to locate to a particular
region is the possibility of agglomeration economies. New firms entering a region might lead
to positive productivity spillovers on existing firms. To test for agglomeration economies,
I look at the differential effect of the policy change on TFP (total factor productivity)
measures in the treated states compared to the control states. I use two different measures of
productivity. First, I construct industry and firm-level TFP measures using the methodology
of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).38 I also construct labor productivity measures defined as
output per man-day and value added per man-day. Columns 1 through 3 in Table 1.15 show
the results for the state-industry level DID regressions comparing aggregate productivity in
38Details in the Appendix.
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the treated states to the control states. I find large increases in aggregate productivity across
various measures of TFP. This differential increase in productivity is the cumulative effect of
both new and existing firms in the treated states. A natural question to ask is whether the
entry of new firms led to increases in productivity for the existing firms. In columns 4 and
5, I run firm-level regressions to look at the effect of the policy change on the productivity of
existing firms, and find no effects. This suggests that the most of the aggregate productivity
gains in the treated states are being driven by the entry of new firms. Although surprising,
it must be kept in mind that this paper looks only at the short to medium term effect of
the policy change and generally existing firms take some time to internalize agglomeration
economies.39 These differences in productivity levels between new and old firms are also
shown in Figure 1.9.
1.5.5 Wages, Rents, and Migration
After looking at various industrial outcomes, it is important to investigate changes in the
local economy. First, I test whether the policy resulted in earnings gains for the residents
of the treated states. It is conceivable that migrant workers move in from other states
to take advantage of the jobs available after the policy change. This might partially or
completely offset the nominal wage gains due to the increase in local prices and rents in
the treated states. I explicitly test for real earnings gain and differential migration as well.
Table 1.16, column 1 reports the results of a difference-in-differences regression specification
comparing total wages in treated states to neighboring states. This regression controls for
district fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects along with individual controls such as
39For example, Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) find that the total factor productivity (TFP)
of incumbent plants grows five years after the opening of a large plant in their county. Also, Wang (2013)
shows that there is positive TFP growth more than six years after the opening of an SEZ in China.
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age, sex, and education status. I find an 11% differential increase in nominal wages40 for
all workers in the treated states compared with the neighboring states. In column 2, I run
the same specification restricted to districts along the border and find a 13% increase in
wages. The magnitude of this effect is similar across the two specifications. Columns 3
and 4 look at wages of workers involved in non-agricultural activities and these wages go
up by 14.5%. In columns 5 and 6, I look at the wages of agricultural workers and find no
differential increase across the treated and control groups. This provides additional support
for the results as the policy was similar to a labor demand shock for the industrial sector
and should not have affected the agricultural sector. In columns 7 and 8, I compare housing
rents across the treated and control groups controlling for district and year fixed effects along
with housing attributes such as floor area, dwelling type, roof type, number of rooms etc. I
find no statistically significant differential effect of the policy change on housing rents. This
suggests that nominal wages might have gone up without corresponding increases in local
prices.
However, housing rents might not be an apt measure of overall price levels in India and
we would need a state-level consumer price index (CPI) to deflate the nominal values. A
state-level CPI is not readily available for different states going back to the early 2000s. I
construct an alternate price index at the state level (1999-2000 as the base year) using state
GDP at constant and current prices from the RBI Handbook of Statistics. The price index
for the neighboring states is shown in Appendix Table A2. I deflate wages and monthly per
capita expenditure and run difference-in-differences specification comparing these outcomes
in treated and control areas. In Table 1.17, columns 1 and 2 show that real wages increase
by 12% -15%. The magnitude is similar to the increase in nominal wages in Table 1.17,
40The wages data comes from the NSS dataset that asks each household member their wages over the
seven days preceding the interview.
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suggesting that the policy did not differentially affect the price levels. Furthermore, in
columns 3 and 4, I also find a differential increase in monthly per capita expenditure by
around 10%. Finally, for column 5, I aggregate the total wages earned in the entire states (the
state-level wage bill). I compare the total wage bill in the treated states to the neighboring
control states and find a 52.8% increase in total wage bill.41 This is comparable to the 40%
increase in industrial wage bill estimated in Table 1.8.
These results suggest that the policy change did not induce differential migration into the
treated regions from control states. I explicitly test for migration in treated areas compared
with control areas in Table 1.18. The definition of migrants follows the questions in the
NSS surveys that elicit information on the last usual place of residence of the respondent.
Using this measure, I define an external migrant as a person whose last usual place of
residence was another state; an internal migrant from within the state but another district.
I also run specifications with economic migrants who report their reason for migration being
work related. I find no statistically significant effect on external migrants and economic
migrants. I find a negative differential effect on internal migrants. This might be because
each district within the treated states had an industrial estate (and more jobs) leading to less
within-state migration. Taken together, Table 1.18 suggests that there was no differential
migration in response to the policy change in treated states compared with control states.
This is consistent with previous literature on India documenting low migration.42
41This is the differential increase in the total wage bill over seven days.
42For example, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) find that in rural areas permanent migration rates of men
out of their origin villages were as low as 8.7 percent in 1999.
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1.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Although the results in the paper suggest that the policy was successful in creating employ-
ment, output, and real earnings gains in the treated states, it might have come at large
costs. I use the treatment effect coefficients to conduct a back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit
analysis. I broadly follow Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013) for this analysis, but in addition
I include firm profits (as a benefit of the policy).43 The benefits of the policy accrue to firm
owners, workers,44 and landowners in the treated states, whereas the costs to the government
include the foregone tax revenues and the actual cost of the capital subsidy. For the ease of
comparison, I provide all numbers in terms of 2007-08 (the last year in my analysis).
The benefits in the treated states can be broken down into three components: (i) increase
in profits of firms in the treated areas, (ii) real wage earnings increases in the treated areas,
and (iii) rental rate gains for landowners in the treated areas. For profits, I first estimate the
treatment effect coefficient using a difference-in-differences specification as in all the earlier
specifications. This is shown in Appendix Table A7. I use the estimated treatment effect co-
efficient on post*treat to calculate the magnitude of the total treatment effect. Note that the
total treatment effect is the difference between the actual total and the counterfactual total
in 2007-08. The counterfactual total is the amount that would have accrued in the absence
of the policy and equals Actual total/(1+β). Similarly, for the real wage bill gains in the
treated states, I use the estimates from the total real wage bill regressions from Table 1.17,
column 5. I multiply the weekly total wage bill by 52 to get the yearly total wage bill. As
shown in Table 1.17, the rental rates do not change differentially and hence I assume the
43Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013) measure the benefits of the EZ program as the total earnings increase
of zone workers, earnings increase for non-resident commuters, improvements in local amenities, and value
of rent reductions outside the zone due to decreases in population. They model firms as price-takers with
constant returns to scale technology. Hence, profits of firms in their analysis is zero.
44Note that in my case, migration is zero and there are no non-resident commuters.
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rental rate gains to landowners are negligible. I show the numbers in Table 1.19a. The total
gains from the policy change are around 102 billion Rupees, of which 72 billion Rupees (USD
1.2 billion) accrues to firm owners45 (as profits) and 30 billion Rupees (USD 480 million)
accrues to workers (as wage bill).
To calculate the costs, I take into account (i) foregone corporate income tax revenue, (ii)
foregone central excise tax revenue, and (iii) actual costs of the capital subsidy. I estimate the
foregone tax revenue by calculating the revenue that the government would have collected in
the absence of the policy. I use the estimated coefficient on post*treat on corporate income
(Appendix table B5) and calculate the counterfactual.46 I use a 35% corporate income tax
rate to measure the total foregone revenue from the corporate income tax exemption. I use
the same method to calculate the foregone revenue from the central excise tax exemption.
The central excise tax is levied on the total value of output. I use the actual central excise
tax receipts collected by the Government of India as a percentage of the value of output as
the effective excise tax rate (7%).47 These numbers are shown in Table 1.19b. The foregone
revenue from corporate income taxes is 34.7 billion Rupees and that from central excise taxes
is 29.3 billion Rupees.
The actual cost of the capital subsidies is also not readily available. In this analysis, I
calculate an upper bound for the actual cost in order to be conservative in estimating the net
benefits of the policy. The policy provided capital subsidies to new and old firms equaling
15% of their investment in plant and machinery up to a maximum amount of Rs. 3,000,000.
45Around 21% of the firms in the treated states were public limited companies. Individual proprietorships
(13%), partnerships (26%) and private limited companies (38%) accounted for the bulk of the remaining
firms. No other detailed shareholder information is available in the dataset.
46Counterfactual = Actual total/(1+β).
47This figure comes from the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report No. CA 20 of 2009-10 -
Union Government (Indirect Taxes).
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I assume that every firm gets the maximum amount to provide an upper bound. In 2007-08,
there were 2634 firms in the treated states.48 Assuming each firm received Rs. 3,000,000,
the total amount spent by the government would be Rs. 7.9 billion. Hence, the total loss for
the government was approximately Rs. 72 billion (USD 1.2 billion). Since these are public
funds, they induce a direct tax burden and a marginal welfare cost associated with acquiring
the revenues. This is given by the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). I use a value of
MCF to equal 1.249 and this gives me a total cost to the government of Rs. 86.4 billion.50
Hence, given the range of values of MCF, the cost to the government is in the range of Rs.
72-86.4 billion.
Comparing the costs and benefits, gives us a range of Rs. 15.6-30 billion (USD 259-480
million) in benefits from the policy change. This is roughly 0.26-0.5% of the combined GDP
of the two treated states.51 Although these numbers provide suggestive evidence on the
cost-effectiveness of the policy, I cannot conclude whether the policy was Pareto-improving
or if the tax-incentive scheme was the most efficient transfer to the treated regions.
1.7 Conclusion
Many argue that a spatially targeted industrial policy is a waste of taxpayers’ money as
it simply reallocates economic activity across regions and does not lead to overall growth.
Policy makers throughout the world however, use such location-based policies to help develop
48Figure from the ASI state×industry panel data.
49Auriol and Warlters (2012) estimate the average MCF in 38 countries in Africa to be between 1.1 and
1.2. Browning (1976) calculated the MCF in the United States to be in the range 1.09-1.16.
50Rs. 72 billion × 1.2.
51Combined state GDP for Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand in 2007-08 was Rs. 598.6 billion (USD
9.6 billion).
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economically lagging regions. Whether location-based tax incentives are effective and help
in industrialization and employment generation at the local level is largely an empirical
question. In the last few years, there has been a growing empirical literature on place-based
policies, mainly as more micro-data has become available. However, these policies have been
understudied in developing countries where regional economic disparities can be large and
labor mobility might be low.
In this paper, I critically examine a location-based tax incentive scheme that provided tax
exemptions and capital subsidies to new and existing firms in two states in India, beginning
2003. I find that the policy change resulted in large increases in employment, output and
capital - both due to entry of new firms and growth by existing firms. I document that the
new firms entering the treated areas are larger and more productive but find no evidence
for relocation of economic activity across the treated and control areas. The policy led to
earnings increases for residents of the treated states without any corresponding increases in
housing rents or local prices. I also show that these real earnings gain might be a result
of low migration into the treated states. Finally, I use my estimates to conduct a simple
cost-benefit analysis that suggests that the policy was cost-effective.
An important caveat is that these results are at best medium-term effects of the policy
change on various economic outcomes. It will be interesting to look at the long run impacts
of this policy after the removal of the incentives [see Kline and Moretti (2013a)]. Whether
or not such policies have a lasting impact (for example, agglomeration economies)52 or only
attract fly-by-night operators that shut shop and relocate to the next area with such benefits
is an important issue but beyond the current scope of this paper. With more data available
in the following years, this seems to be a promising avenue for future research.
52See Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010).
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics at the state×3-digit industry level
State Time period Observations Mean Std Dev
Number employed All states Pre-2003 3604 3962.88 12496.62
Post-2003 6179 4162.30 13082.27
Treated Pre-2003 231 589.68 1214.31
Post-2003 424 834.16 1545.70
Neighboring states Pre-2003 709 3153.96 6118.20
Post-2003 1203 3554.21 6825.79
All major states Pre-2003 2746 4952.17 14023.84
Post-2003 4630 5237.32 14814.82
Number of factories All states Pre-2003 3604 107.64 252.96
Post-2003 6179 112.77 270.42
Treated Pre-2003 231 15.98 27.82
Post-2003 424 21.15 32.17
Neighboring states Pre-2003 709 103.90 163.59
Post-2003 1203 110.14 188.27
All major states Pre-2003 2746 134.31 282.95
Post-2003 4630 141.98 304.79
Total output All states Pre-2003 3604 83793.55 240913.20
(in ‘00,000 Rs.) Post-2003 6179 162689.00 515128.30
Treated Pre-2003 231 15068.07 26703.81
Post-2003 424 41973.70 94545.83
Neighboring states Pre-2003 709 73225.33 128034.00
Post-2003 1203 131358.60 256813.00
All major states Pre-2003 2746 103814.20 271097.10
Post-2003 4630 202135.20 584000.10
Fixed capital All states Pre-2003 3604 35414.08 133253.90
(in ‘00,000 Rs.) Post-2003 6179 51037.45 180756.90
Treated Pre-2003 231 7358.37 20079.97
Post-2003 424 18860.29 61088.17
Neighboring states Pre-2003 709 24231.10 57330.15
Post-2003 1203 32682.40 79836.12
All major states Pre-2003 2746 44306.31 150713.20
Post-2003 4630 63988.66 205354.20
Wage bill All states Pre-2003 3604 5373.16 14082.43
(in ‘00,000 Rs.) Post-2003 6179 7623.88 19639.85
Treated Pre-2003 231 1167.24 3509.69
Post-2003 424 1936.53 4662.96
Neighboring states Pre-2003 709 4166.21 6912.09
Post-2003 1203 6265.78 10883.73
All major states Pre-2003 2746 6775.80 15810.68
Post-2003 4630 9684.05 22205.34
Notes: Treated states: Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh; Neighboring states: Haryana, Punjab, Delhi, Chandigarh, Uttar
Pradesh; All major states: Neighboring states plus Rajasthan, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Madhya
Pradesh, Orissa, Goa, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Jharkhand, Gujarat, and West Bengal. Observations here are state×3-
digit-year observations.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics at the firm-level
State Time period Observations Mean Std Dev
Number employed All states Pre-2003 93276 41.50 241.12
Post-2003 195581 42.64 198.55
Treated Pre-2003 1915 39.63 151.29
Post-2003 5222 43.43 127.28
Neighboring states Pre-2003 18192 32.74 120.00
Post-2003 39710 36.03 125.26
All major states Pre-2003 84879 41.55 245.93
Post-2003 176605 42.62 202.64
Total output All states Pre-2003 88126 927.58 13589.21
(in ‘00,000 Rs.) Post-2003 187796 1726.92 32981.24
Treated Pre-2003 1743 1097.01 4461.96
Post-2003 4733 2300.66 8030.17
Neighboring states Pre-2003 17234 800.43 6734.20
Post-2003 38348 1361.89 1361.89
All major states Pre-2003 80680 919.38 13874.97
Post-2003 170818 1700.22 33725.87
Fixed capital All states Pre-2003 96718 357.52 8204.424
(in ‘00,000 Rs.) Post-2003 206686 494.65 11057.01
Treated Pre-2003 1961 471.02 3227.43
Post-2003 5461 928.29 9743.92
Neighboring states Pre-2003 18741 240.86 3613.18
Post-2003 42523 309.13 3426.12
All major states Pre-2003 87607 359.06 8383.13
Post-2003 185860 493.56 493.56
Wage bill All states Pre-2003 98444 22.79 280.09
(in ‘00,000 Rs.) Post-2003 211175 26.98 336.92
Treated Pre-2003 1972 28.25 264.65
Post-2003 5537 31.39 292.88
Neighboring states Pre-2003 18847 16.67 110.60
Post-2003 42922 20.74 131.72
All major states Pre-2003 89306 23.05 285.46
Post-2003 190186 27.31 344.27
Notes: Treated states: Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh; Neighboring states: Haryana, Punjab, Delhi, Chandigarh, Uttar
Pradesh; All major states: Neighboring states plus Rajasthan, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Madhya
Pradesh, Orissa, Goa, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Jharkhand, Gujarat, and West Bengal. Observations here are firm-year
observations.
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics for migration, wages, and housing rents
States Time Period Observations Mean Std. Dev
External migrant Treated states Pre-2003 15194 0.05 0.22
Post-2003 16575 0.09 0.28
Neighboring states Pre-2003 118045 0.04 0.19
Post-2003 103797 0.05 0.22
Internal migrant Treated states Pre-2003 15194 0.09 0.28
Post-2003 16575 0.06 0.24
Neighboring states Pre-2003 118045 0.09 0.28
Post-2003 103797 0.09 0.29
Economic migrant Treated states Pre-2003 15194 0.10 0.30
Post-2003 16575 0.11 0.31
Neighboring states Pre-2003 118045 0.05 0.22
Post-2003 103797 0.06 0.23
Total wages (in Rs.) Treated states Pre-2003 1714 879.36 861.36
(all workers) Post-2003 6327 1080.16 1117.18
Neighboring states Pre-2003 11772 691.05 945.31
Post-2003 31724 829.97 1075.31
Housing rents Treated states Pre-2003 392 422.92 377.45
(in Rs.) Post-2003 511 749.74 804.42
Neighboring states Pre-2003 2384 656.28 954.79
Post-2003 3517 1176.71 1502.73
Notes: Treated states: Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh; Neighboring states: Haryana, Punjab, Delhi, Chandigarh, Uttar
Pradesh; External migrant is defined as a person whose last usual place of residence is outside the state; Internal migrant is
one whose last usual place of residence is the same state but a different district; Economic migrant is one who migrated for a
work related reason. Total wages are defined as the wages earned over the seven days preceding the interview.
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Table 1.4: Log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
post*treat 0.371*** 0.379*** 0.418*** 0.372***
(0.0740) (0.0827) (0.0884) (0.0999)
[0.129] [0.143] [0.141] [0.154]
Observations 2,567 2,567 2,567 2,567
R-squared 0.688 0.709 0.691 0.712
Panel B
post*treat 0.427*** 0.443*** 0.439*** 0.448***
(0.0877) (0.0899) (0.0788) (0.0822)
[0.124] [0.138] [0.131] [0.141]
Observations 8,028 8,028 8,028 8,028
R-squared 0.625 0.634 0.626 0.634
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE No Yes No Yes
time varying controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is log employment in the 3 digit industry in a particular state. The coefficient on the interaction
term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-treatment state-level variables interacted with
a time dummy for each year. Panel A shows the regressions with the neighboring states as the control group whereas Panel B
uses all major states as the control group. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-year level. Standard errors
in square brackets are clustered at the state and year level using CGM multi-way clustering. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant
at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 1.5: Log of total factories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
post*treat 0.268*** 0.267*** 0.291*** 0.270***
(0.0569) (0.0616) (0.0792) (0.0815)
[0.107] [0.107] [0.140] [0.133]
Observations 2,567 2,567 2,567 2,567
R-squared 0.725 0.736 0.727 0.738
Panel B
post*treat 0.310*** 0.311*** 0.315*** 0.315***
(0.0680) (0.0693) (0.0596) (0.0610)
[0.0943] [0.105] [0.0955] [0.104]
Observations 8,031 8,031 8,031 8,031
R-squared 0.715 0.719 0.716 0.719
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE No Yes No Yes
time varying controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of total number of factories in a 3 digit industry in a particular state. The coefficient on
the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-treatment state-level variables
interacted with a time dummy for each year. Panel A shows the regressions with the neighboring states as the control group
whereas Panel B uses all major states as the control group. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-year level.
Standard errors in square brackets are clustered at the state and year level using CGM multi-way clustering. ***Significant at
1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 1.6: Log of total output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
post*treat 0.579*** 0.584*** 0.619*** 0.566***
(0.0969) (0.108) (0.116) (0.132)
[0.158] [0.180] [0.199] [0.199]
Observations 2,567 2,567 2,567 2,567
R-squared 0.655 0.679 0.658 0.682
Panel B
post*treat 0.561*** 0.577*** 0.623*** 0.639***
(0.106) (0.107) (0.101) (0.104)
[0.146] [0.159] [0.160] [0.173]
Observations 8,031 8,031 8,031 8,031
R-squared 0.611 0.622 0.611 0.622
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE No Yes No Yes
time varying controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of total output in a 3 digit industry in a particular state. The coefficient on the interaction
term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-treatment state-level variables interacted with
a time dummy for each year. Panel A shows the regressions with the neighboring states as the control group whereas Panel B
uses all major states as the control group. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-year level. Standard errors
in square brackets are clustered at the state and year level using CGM multi-way clustering. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant
at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 1.7: Log of fixed capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
post*treat 0.718*** 0.714*** 0.878*** 0.866***
(0.132) (0.147) (0.209) (0.225)
[0.236] [0.264] [0.322] [0.347]
Observations 2,567 2,567 2,567 2,567
R-squared 0.668 0.691 0.672 0.695
Panel B
post*treat 0.711*** 0.728*** 0.776*** 0.787***
(0.158) (0.160) (0.145) (0.149)
[0.230] [0.243] [0.244] [0.258]
Observations 8,030 8,030 8,030 8,030
R-squared 0.627 0.635 0.628 0.636
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE No Yes No Yes
time varying controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of fixed capital in a 3 digit industry in a particular state. The coefficient on the interaction
term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-treatment state-level variables interacted with
a time dummy for each year. Panel A shows the regressions with the neighboring states as the control group whereas Panel B
uses all major states as the control group. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-year level. Standard errors
in square brackets are clustered at the state and year level using CGM multi-way clustering. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant
at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 1.8: Log of wage bill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
post*treat 0.392*** 0.400*** 0.322*** 0.275***
(0.0826) (0.0957) (0.0788) (0.0935)
[0.148] [0.173] [0.134] [0.140]
Observations 2,567 2,567 2,567 2,567
R-squared 0.660 0.682 0.663 0.685
Panel B
post*treat 0.412*** 0.427*** 0.437*** 0.449***
(0.0938) (0.0983) (0.0891) (0.0948)
[0.138] [0.157] [0.145] [0.165]
Observations 8,030 8,030 8,030 8,030
R-squared 0.604 0.611 0.604 0.612
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE No Yes No Yes
time varying controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of wage bill in a 3 digit industry in a particular state. The coefficient on the interaction
term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-treatment state-level variables interacted with
a time dummy for each year. Panel A shows the regressions with the neighboring states as the control group whereas Panel B
uses all major states as the control group. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-year level. Standard errors
in square brackets are clustered at the state and year level using CGM multi-way clustering. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant
at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
44
Table 1.9: Number of firm closures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
closed closed closed closed
post*treat 0.0487 0.311 0.469 -0.377
(0.396) (0.304) (0.556) (0.319)
Observations 2,567 2,567 8,031 8,031
R-squared 0.312 0.321 0.275 0.277
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
time varying controls No Yes No Yes
Control Group Neighboring Neighboring Major states Major states
states states
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-
treatment state-level variables interacted with a time dummy for each year. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year
level. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
Table 1.10: Testing for relocation of industrial activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (employed) Log (total factories) Log (total output) Log (fixed capital)
post*neighbors 0.0501* 0.00974 -0.0371 -0.0273
(0.0267) (0.0168) (0.0338) (0.0374)
Observations 7,375 7,375 7,375 7,375
R-squared 0.629 0.716 0.621 0.635
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*neighbors shows the effect of the policy change on neighboring states as
compared to all other major states. The two treated states are omitted in this regression. Standard errors are clustered at the
state-year level. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 1.11: Firm-level regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (employed)
post*treat 0.0747* 0.103** 0.0740 0.110*
(0.0386) (0.0400) (0.0577) (0.0544)
Observations 63,629 63,629 13,185 13,185
R-squared 0.939 0.942 0.946 0.953
Log (total output)
post*treat 0.0866** 0.114*** 0.177** 0.237***
(0.0430) (0.0414) (0.0711) (0.0722)
Observations 60,664 60,664 12,315 12,315
R-squared 0.965 0.967 0.970 0.976
Log (wage bill)
post*treat 0.0807** 0.113** 0.108** 0.129**
(0.0399) (0.0423) (0.0466) (0.0565)
Observations 63,650 63,650 13,193 13,193
R-squared 0.949 0.952 0.954 0.960
Log (fixed capital)
post*treat 0.0552 0.0709* 0.0804 0.0812
(0.0368) (0.0387) (0.0501) (0.0495)
Observations 67,033 67,033 14,125 14,125
R-squared 0.973 0.974 0.978 0.981
Log (additions to fixed capital)
post*treat 0.278** 0.275** 0.277 0.406**
(0.120) (0.108) (0.170) (0.154)
Observations 52,906 52,906 10,503 10,503
R-squared 0.856 0.864 0.875 0.899
Log (additions to plant and machinery)
post*treat 0.255** 0.256** 0.199* 0.246
(0.110) (0.101) (0.113) (0.216)
Observations 41,674 41,674 8,222 8,222
R-squared 0.858 0.869 0.883 0.914
Control group Neighboring states Neighboring states Border districts Border districts
firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit industry year FE No Yes No Yes
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-
treatment state-level variables interacted with a time dummy for each year. Standard errors in columns 1 to 2 are clustered
at the state-year level, and at the district level for columns 3 and 4. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at
10%.
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Table 1.12: Removing multi-establishment firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (employed) Log (output) Log (fixed capital) Log (additions to
plant and machinery)
post*treat 0.0919** 0.144*** 0.0656* 0.232**
(0.0437) (0.0476) (0.0383) (0.103)
Observations 55,599 52,682 58,796 34,695
R-squared 0.939 0.969 0.973 0.871
firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Control group includes the neighboring
states. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
Table 1.13: Firm-level regression - testing for spillovers
(1) (2) (3)
Log (employed) Log (total output) Log (fixed capital)
post*treat 0.151*** 0.162** 0.0388
(0.0535) (0.0698) (0.0628)
Observations 17,456 16,316 18,139
R-squared 0.958 0.975 0.978
firm FE Yes Yes Yes
4-digit industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Control group includes districts that
are away from the borders in the neighboring states. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***Significant at 1%,
**Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 1.14: Testing for spillovers - comparing bordering districts to districts further away
(1) (2) (3)
Log(employed) Log(total output) Log(fixed capital)
post*neighoring-district 0.0575 -0.128 -0.0749
(0.0579) (0.0799) (0.0808)
Observations 17,451 16,679 18,708
R-squared 0.955 0.979 0.978
firm FE Yes Yes Yes
4-digit industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*neighoring-district shows the treatment effect where the treated group is the
bordering districts in the neighboring states. Control group includes districts that are away from the borders in the neighboring
states. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 1.15: Productivity regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (TFP) Log (labor productivity 1) Log (labor productivity 2) Log (labor productivity) Log (TFP)
(Levinsohn-Petrin) (Value added / man-days) (Total output/man-days) (Total output/man-days) (Levinsohn-Petrin)
post*treat 0.288*** 0.388*** 0.191*** -0.0334 -0.00412
(0.0726) (0.0640) (0.0381) (0.0348) (0.0767)
Observations 2,472 2,482 2,511 58,086 46,213
R-squared 0.634 0.332 0.486 0.932 0.859
state FE Yes Yes Yes - -
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes - -
firm FE No No No Yes Yes
4-digit industry year FE No No No Yes Yes
Age Controls No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Columns 1 through 3 show state-industry
regressions with the neighboring states as the control group. Columns 4 and 5 show firm-level regressions. Firm fixed effects
subsume state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%,
*Significant at 10%.
Table 1.16: Nominal wages and Rents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log (wages) Log (wages) Log (wages) Log (wages) Log (wages) Log (wages) Log (rent) Log (rent)
[all] [all] [non-agricultural] [non-agricultural] [agricultural] [agricultural] [all] [all]
post*treat 0.111** 0.132* 0.147*** 0.145* 0.0215 -0.0273 0.396 -0.0583
(0.0531) (0.0640) (0.0561) (0.0714) (0.135) (0.189) (0.266) (0.313)
Observations 51,455 10,189 40,964 8,387 10,491 1,802 3,500 603
R-squared 0.667 0.615 0.642 0.660 0.433 0.239 0.540 0.451
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
control group Neighboring Bordering Neighboring Bordering Neighboring Bordering Neighboring Bordering
states districts states districts states districts states districts
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Controls for columns 1 through 6 include
age, sex, educational status, marital status and relationship to household head. Controls for columns 7 and 8 include attributes
of the house such as number of rooms, kitchen type, dwelling type, roof type and floor type. Standard errors are clustered at
the district level. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 1.17: Real wages and real monthly per capita expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (real wages) Log (real wages) Log (real MPCE) Log (real MPCE) Log (real wage bill)
post*treat 0.122** 0.146** 0.0967** 0.107 0.528***
(0.0495) (0.0616) (0.0408) (0.0739) (0.168)
Observations 51,455 10,189 88,731 17,157 531
R-squared 0.668 0.605 0.358 0.243 0.287
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry-year FE Yes Yes No No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No
control group Neighboring states Bordering districts Neighboring states Bordering districts Neighboring states
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Controls for columns 1 and 2 include age,
sex, educational status, marital status and relationship to household head. Controls for columns 3 and 4 include household type,
social group, rural-urban and religion. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at
5%, *Significant at 10%.
Table 1.18: Testing for differential migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
external migrant external migrant internal migrant internal migrant economic migrant economic migrant
post*treat 0.0172 0.0396 -0.0252** -0.0236 0.00486 0.0349
(0.0272) (0.0412) (0.0120) (0.0173) (0.0244) (0.0311)
Observations 253,611 45,301 253,611 45,301 253,611 45,301
R-squared 0.087 0.043 0.031 0.017 0.076 0.026
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group Neighboring states Bordering districts Neighboring states Bordering districts Neighboring states Bordering districts
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. External migrant is one whose last
usual place of residence was another state or country. Internal migrant’s last usual place of residence was the same state but
another district. An economic migrant migrated for work related reasons. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 1.19a: Total Benefits
Actual Total in 2007-08 Treatment effect Total impact in 2007-08
(billion Rupees) coefficient (in billion Rupees)
profits 148.85 0.93 71.80
total wage bill 87.36 0.528 30.19
Table 1.19b: Total Costs
Actual Total in 2007-08 Treatment effect Counterfactual Tax rate Loss in revenue
(in billion Rupees) coefficient (in billion Rupees) (percent) (in billion Rupees)
corporate income 176.31 0.78 99.05 0.35 34.67
total output 660.75 0.579 418.46 0.07 29.29
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Notes: ASI state×industry data from 1999-2000 to 2007-08.
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Notes: ASI state×industry data from 1999-2000 to 2007-08.
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Notes: These graphs plot the coefficients obtained from a regression of the outcome variable (mentioned on
top of the graph) on the interaction between the treated states dummy and year dummies. The regressions
control for state, year, and 3-digit industry fixed effects. The Y-axis shows the estimated coefficients and
the X-axis shows the various years. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level.
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Notes: ASI state×industry data from 1999-2000 to 2007-08.
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Notes: ASI firm-level data from 1999-2000 to 2007-08.
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Notes: ASI firm-level data from 1999-2000 to 2007-08.
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Notes: ASI firm-level data from 1999-2000 to 2007-08.
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Notes: Panel A shows the gaps in employment between the treated and the synthetic control unit while
Panel B shows a histogram for inference.
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Notes: Panel A shows the gaps in total factories between the treated and the synthetic control unit while
Panel B shows a histogram for inference.
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Notes: Panel A shows the gaps in total output between the treated and the synthetic control unit while
Panel B shows a histogram for inference. Total output is measured in ‘00,000 Rs.
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Notes: Panel A shows the gaps in fixed capital between the treated and the synthetic control unit while
Panel B shows a histogram for inference. Fixed capital is measured in ‘00,000 Rs.
Chapter 2





Place-based policies are used by governments to address regional economic imbalances by
providing tax exemptions and other benefits to firms to locate to economically lagging re-
gions. Some examples of these policies include the Empowerment Zones, Enterprise Zones
and Promise Zones in the United States, Regional Selective Assistance in the United King-
dom, and ZFU (“Zones Franches Urbaines”) in France. Despite their popularity with policy
makers, economists criticize place-based policies on the grounds that they mainly move eco-
nomic activity from one location to another without increasing aggregate output.1 Moreover,
in the spatial-equilibrium framework commonly used to model place-based policies (Roback
(1982), Moretti (2011), Kline and Moretti (2013b)), whether the welfare gains from the pol-
icy accrue to workers or landowners in the particular locality largely depends on the mobility
of workers and the elasticity of housing supply. Notwithstanding the theoretical arguments,
the effectiveness of place-based policies remains an empirical question.
Most of the previous empirical work evaluating location-based policies has focused on
the United States and Europe, and its effects in developing countries have remained largely
understudied. Furthermore, the focus on developed countries has meant that the important
question of how place-based policies affect informal sector firms has not been explored. Al-
though most place-based policies impact formal firms, there can be important effects on the
informal sector. On the one hand, if informal firms expect larger benefits from formalizing
after a tax exemption scheme, the policy might lead to a decline in informality. On the other
hand, many informal firms source goods and services to formal firms and we might find an
increase in both informal and formal firms as a result of the place-based policy. Moreover, a
major reason why informal firms do not register in the formal sector is to avoid paying taxes.
1Theoretical arguments can be found in Glaeser (2001), Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008), Moretti (2011),
Kline and Moretti (2013b), and Gaubert (2014).
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Hence a tax exemption scheme might incentivize informal firms to register to become formal.
Given the amount of tax revenues lost by governments due to firms remaining informal, any
incentive scheme that induces informal firms to register is of great policy importance.
To study these important empirical questions, I look at the impact of a place-based pol-
icy in India on informal firms. More specifically, I analyze the New Industrial Policy for the
states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh. As part of the policy, the federal government
provided tax exemptions and capital subsidies to formal firms (both new and existing) start-
ing in 2003.
To the best of my knowledge, no other policy affected industrial firms in the states of
Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh differentially more or less than other states, beginning
2003, and this helps me identify the causal effect of the policy change using a difference-
in-differences (DID) methodology. I use two rounds of the informal sector surveys to look
at the changes in informal firms (on average) in the treated regions (Uttarakhand and Hi-
machal Pradesh) compared to control regions, before and after the policy change. To form
valid counterfactuals for the treated units, I use three control groups. The strictest empiri-
cal specification compares informal firms in the bordering districts in the treated states to
bordering districts in the control states. Then, I compare informal firms in the treated states
to informal firms in neighboring control states and finally, to all major states taken together
as a control group.
I find no statistically significant difference in average employment, gross value added,
total output, and the proportion of formal registrations among informal firms in the treated
regions as compared to control regions, before and after the policy change. In fact, on aver-
age, informal firms in the treated regions were more likely to self report to have contracted
in size as compared to firms in control regions as a result of the policy change. Despite
the null results on average, I find substantial heterogeneity by firm type in terms of reg-
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istration by informal firms. I find that Directory Manufacturing Establishments (DMEs)
and Non-directory Manufacturing Establishments (NDMEs)2 in the treated regions showed
a differentially higher likelihood to register as compared to the control regions because of
the policy change. However, Own Account Manufacturing Establishments (OAMEs)3 in the
treated states do not exhibit differential response in terms of registration as compared to the
control regions. These results suggest that the tax exemption scheme incentivized informal
firms that hire workers to register but had no effect on smaller informal firms which do not
hire workers.
This paper is closely related to the literature on business registration decisions of informal
firms. For example, de Andrade, Bruhn, and McKenzie (2013) find that enforcement visits
by a municipal inspector led to more formal registrations by informal firms in Brazil, whereas
information and free registration costs had no effect.4 Bruhn (2011) finds that a Mexican
regulation that simplified business entry regulation led to former wage earners opening new
businesses but did not induce former unregistered businesses to register. To explain why
the Mexican regulation (used in Bruhn (2011)) did not induce former unregistered informal
firms to register, Bruhn (2013) separates informal business owners into those that are similar
to wage workers and those that are similar to formal business owners. Bruhn (2013) finds
that the policy did not induce the wage worker informal firm category to register but led
to more registrations by the formal business owner category in regions that had constraints
to entrepreneurship before the policy change.5 The results in my paper are similar as I find
2DMEs employ a total of six or more hired workers while NDMEs employ one to five hired workers.
3These are establishments not employing any hired worker.
4De Giorgi and Rahman (2013) also find that providing information had no impact on actual registration
for informal firms in Bangladesh.
5Many other papers have argued that informal sector employment is a mix of firms that are similar to
wage workers and those that are closer to small formal firms - see for example, de Mel, McKenzie, and
68
that the tax exemption scheme induced more registrations for firms that hire workers (that
are more likely to resemble formal firms) and no effect on own account enterprises (that are
more likely to resemble wage workers).
This paper also adds to the growing empirical literature evaluating place-based policies,
most of which has focused on the United States (Neumark and Kolko (2010), Greenbaum and
Engberg (2004), Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007), Ham, Swenson, Imrohoroglu, and Song
(2011), and Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013) among others) and European countries such
as United Kingdom (Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and van Reenen (2012)), France (Mayer,
Mayneris, and Py (2012), Givord, Rathelot, and Sillard (2013)) and Italy (Bronzini and
de Blasio (2006)). A few recent papers have also studied place-based policies in the context
of developing countries such as China (Wang (2013)) and India (Chaurey (2014)). However,
all these papers evaluate the effects on formal sector firms and the local population. My
paper makes a significant contribution to the existing literature by studying the effects of a
place-based policy on informal firms.
The results of this paper therefore provide suggestive evidence that location-based tax
exemptions might be another tool for policy makers to incentivize informal firms to register
and bring them under the ambit of formal taxation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the details of the
policy. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical strategy, Section 2.4 describes the data, and the
results are discussed in Section 2.5. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
Woodruff (2010) and Gunther and Launov (2012).
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2.2 New Industrial Policy for Uttarakhand and Hi-
machal Pradesh
The New Industrial Policy for Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh was designed with a view
to industrialize the two states located in the northern part of India.6 The two states share
international borders with China and Nepal, and cover under 4% of India’s total area, two-
thirds of which is under forest cover and mountainous terrain. The industrial base in the
two states also started at a very low level and in 2000, they only accounted for 1% of the
industrial output in India. Due to their hilly terrain and international borders, these two
states were in the list of “special category states” that received preferential fiscal benefits
from the federal government.
As part of the New Industrial Policy, starting 2003, the Government of India (federal
government) decided to provide 100% excise duty exemption for 10 years and 100% income
tax exemption for 5 years, for new industrial units. The same benefits were extended to
existing industrial units if they expanded their fixed capital investment by 25%. In addition,
all firms were eligible for a capital investment subsidy equaling 15% of their investment in
plant and machinery up to Rs.3,000,000. The excise tax exemption remained operational
until 31st March 2010 and the income tax exemption remained operational until 31st March
2012.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
The main focus of this paper is to empirically test whether the New Industrial Policy led
to differential responses by informal firms in the treated regions as compared to the control
6See figure 2.1.
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regions. The policy change affected formal firms in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh
beginning 2003, and this state-year variation can be used in a differences-in-differences (DID)
specification to estimate the causal effect of the policy change.
Although the policy affected formal firms, there might be a number of reasons to expect
that informal firms would respond. First, informal firms are linked to formal firms because
they supply goods and services to the formal sector firms and hence the average size of an
informal firm may increase as more formal firms enter the treated regions. There might be a
decline in the size of the informal sector firms if competition from formal firms forces them
out of the market. Finally, in terms of registration with a government agency, a full tax
exemption scheme might be a huge incentive to register for informal firms. This is because
registration with an agency gives them benefits such as access to government schemes like
cheap credit, marketing support, and business training among others without being burdened
by taxes.
To test the effects of the policy on informal firms using a DID framework, I use three
control groups as counterfactuals for the treated regions. First, I run a bordering districts
DID specification, which essentially compares informal firms in the treated states in the
districts along the border to those in the control states in districts along the border, before
and after the policy change. Then, I run regression specifications comparing informal firms
in the treated states to those in the neighboring control states or all major states taken
together, before and after 2003.
I run regressions of the form:
yisjt = αs + λj + δj + ψt + β(postt × treats) + γ(Xisjt) + εisjt (2.1)
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where i,s,j,t refer to informal firm, state or district, industry, and year respectively. The
coefficient β on the interaction of postt and treats where
postt =
 1 if year is 2003 or after0 if year is pre 2003
treats =
 1 if state is Uttarakhand or Himachal Pradesh0 otherwise (control states),
is the treatment effect of the policy change. yisjt represents an outcome variable such as
employment, output, gross value added or whether the firm is registered by a government
agency. The regressions control for year, industry, and district fixed effects. Xisjt includes
controls for firm specific characteristics such as type of enterprise (OAME, NDME, DME),
ownership type (sole proprietorship, partnership, cooperative society etc.), nature of oper-
ation (perennial or seasonal), location of the enterprise, source of inputs, whether the firm
maintains accounts and whether the firm is urban/rural. All regressions also use the weights
provided in the data set.
2.4 Data
I use two rounds of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) unorganized man-
ufacturing enterprises surveys - Round 56 (2000-01) and Round 62 (2005-06). This gives
me information on one round both before and after the policy change in 2003. These sur-
veys are conducted by the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (MoSPI) and
cover unorganized enterprises engaged in manufacturing activities. The unorganized man-
ufacturing surveys largely covers those manufacturing units that are not covered under by
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the Annual Survey of Industries, and geographically covers almost all of India.7 The surveys
elicit information on the ownership structure, registration status, problems faced and assis-
tance received, and other firm level information such as employment, sales, output, inputs,
value added etc.
The enterprises in the surveys are categorized as (i) OAME (own account manufacturing
enterprises) - those that do not hire regular workers, (ii) NDME (Non-directory manufac-
turing enterprises) - those that employ one to five hired workers, and (iii) DME (Directory
manufacturing enterprises) - employ a total of six or more hired workers.
Table 2.1 shows some summary statistics for the data. OAMEs on average have less than
2 employees across different groups and years, whereas NDME/DMEs have on average 5
employees. Output, gross value added, and registration status is also lower for OAME than
NDME/DMEs.
2.5 Results
I discuss the results of the regressions using the entire sample (Tables 2.2 through 2.7) and
then I report the results by restricting the sample to OAME and NDME/DME separately
(Tables 2.8 through 2.11).
In all the regression results in Tables 2.2 through 2.7, columns 1 and 2 use the bordering
districts as the control group, followed by neighboring states in columns 3 and 4, and finally
all major states in columns 5 and 6.8 I control for district, 2-digit industry, and year fixed
effects in each of the regressions. The district and industry fixed effects control for time in-
7Annual Survey of Industries is a survey of large manufacturing plants registered under Sections 2m(i)
and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948.
8The control groups are listed in the Appendix.
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variant district and industry characteristics. I also control for firm-level characteristics such
as type of enterprise (OAME, NDME, DME), ownership type (sole proprietorship, partner-
ship, cooperative society etc.), nature of operation (perennial or seasonal), location of the
enterprise, source of inputs, whether the firm maintains accounts, and whether the firm is
urban/rural.
In Table 2.2, I find no statistically significant effect of the policy change on employment
of informal firms in treated regions as compared to control regions, before and after the
policy change. This suggests that the policy change had no differential effect on employ-
ment in informal firms on average in the treated states as compared to the control states.
Similar results are mirrored in the regressions for gross value added (Table 2.3) and output
(Table 2.4), where I find that the policy change did not lead to any differential effect on the
size of the informal firms in treated regions compared to control regions. This is also clear
from the kernel density graphs which do not show any change after the policy came into
effect (Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4)
In Table 2.5, I look at the average response of informal firms in terms of registering with
a government agency in response to the policy change. All firms taken together, I do not
find a differential impact of the policy change on firms’ registration status. I also do not
find a differential effect on the proportion of young firms as a result of the policy change
(Table 2.6). I then look at a self reported measure of whether the firm had contracted in
size over the preceding 3 years in Table 2.7. I find that informal firms are differentially more
likely to report that they contracted in size in treated states than the control states after
the policy change relative to before the policy change.
Having found no differential effects between informal firms in treated regions compared
to control regions (before and after the policy change), I then look at the effects of the
policy by separately analyzing OAMEs and NDME/DMEs. The idea is similar in spirit to
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Bruhn (2013) who divides informal firms in Mexico into two categories - those that resemble
wage workers and those that resemble formal firms. In this paper, OAME and NDME/DME
provide a similar distinction. In this analysis, I categorize establishments as either OAME
(own account establishments) or NDME/DME (establishments hiring workers), and run re-
gressions separately for the two groups. In general, we would expect to find a differential
response of the policy on NDME/DMEs but not on OAMEs.
In Table 2.8, columns 1 through 3, look at the effect of the policy on the likelihood of
OAMEs to register. Column 1 uses the bordering districts as the control group, followed
by neighboring states (column 2) and all major states in column 3. I find no effect of the
policy on the likelihood to register with a government agency for OAMEs. This is consistent
with Bruhn (2013) who finds no registration response by informal firms that have similar
characteristics to a wage worker. Columns 4 through 6 look at the effect of the policy on
NDME/DMEs. In column 4, the control group is bordering districts and I find that the
policy change led to a 13.1% increase in the likelihood of registration for NDME/DMEs
in the treated regions relative to the control regions (after the policy change compared to
before the policy change). In column 5, I compare informal firms in the treated states to
the neighboring control states, and I find a 12.8% increase in the likelihood of registration.
Column 6 uses all major states as the control group and I find a 13% differential increase
in the likelihood of registration. The coefficient post*treat across Columns 4, 5, and 6 are
similar in magnitude, providing credibility to the estimates.
I then check whether the policy change led to a differential effect on informal firms in
terms of average employment, gross value added, and output for OAMEs and NDME/DMEs
separately. In Tables 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11, I find no differential effect of the policy on
the employment, gross value added, and output. Taken together, these results suggest that
the place-based tax exemption scheme induced NDME/DMEs to register with government
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agencies, but had no effect on OAMEs. However, the policy had no impact on the average
size of the informal firms (employment, gross value added, output) in the treated regions as
compared to the control regions.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the effects of a place-based tax exemption scheme on informal firms,
a question that has not been explored in previous literature. I examine the New Industrial
Policy for Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, that provided full excise tax and income tax
exemption along with a capital subsidy for new and existing firms starting 2003. Although
the policy was targeted towards formal firms, it is conceivable that it would have effects on
the informal sector.
I find that on average the policy did not lead to an increase in employment, gross value
added, and output of informal firms in the treated states compared to the control states.
There is some evidence that the informal firms in the treated states were more likely to
self report to have contracted in size after the policy relative to before the policy change
compared to informal firms in the control states. In terms of registration with a government
agency, on average I find no effect of the tax exemption scheme on informal firms. However,
looking at own account informal firms and NDME/DMEs separately reveals heterogeneous
effects of the policy change on registration likelihood. I find that the tax exemption scheme
differentially increased the likelihood of registration for NDME/DMEs (informal firms that
hire regular workers) in treated regions compared to control regions, but there was no effect
of the policy on OAMEs (informal firms that do not hire workers). The policy did not lead
to a differential effect in terms of employment, gross value added, or output for the different
kinds of firms.
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Taken together, the results suggest that tax exemption schemes can be an incentive for
informal firms to register, especially for NDMEs and DMEs. What other policies can induce



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log [employment] log [employment] log [employment] log [employment] log [employment] log [employment]
post*treat 0.0467 0.0273 0.0439 0.00463 0.0424 0.0175
(0.0482) (0.0295) (0.0396) (0.0256) (0.0406) (0.0238)
Constant 0.951*** 0.567*** 0.930*** 0.457*** 1.014*** 0.591***
(0.120) (0.144) (0.0428) (0.0633) (0.0489) (0.0460)
Observations 13,484 13,466 62,716 62,607 269,525 269,308
R-squared 0.235 0.589 0.186 0.581 0.181 0.586
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
control group Border districts Border districts Neighboring states Neighboring states Major states Major states
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.3: Gross Value Added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log [GVA] log [GVA] log [GVA] log [GVA] log [GVA] log [GVA]
post*treat 0.122 0.0176 0.0310 0.00411 0.0546 0.0560
(0.325) (0.194) (0.196) (0.111) (0.190) (0.0986)
Constant 10.05*** 9.001*** 9.122*** 8.753*** 9.196*** 9.553***
(0.355) (0.328) (0.210) (0.261) (0.189) (0.171)
Observations 13,377 13,371 62,102 62,068 267,317 267,235
R-squared 0.406 0.601 0.325 0.595 0.285 0.577
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
control group Border districts Border districts Neighboring states Neighboring states Major states Major states
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.4: Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log [output] log [output] log [output] log [output] log [output] log [output]
post*treat 0.129 0.0256 0.0729 0.0607 0.106 0.106
(0.346) (0.215) (0.202) (0.119) (0.195) (0.108)
Constant 10.75*** 10.38*** 9.781*** 9.975*** 10.00*** 11.06***
(0.451) (0.407) (0.185) (0.288) (0.159) (0.207)
Observations 13,396 13,390 62,166 62,132 267,457 267,375
R-squared 0.450 0.646 0.351 0.622 0.335 0.615
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
control group Border districts Border districts Neighboring states Neighboring states Major states Major states
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.5: Registration with a government agency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
registered registered registered registered registered registered
post*treat 0.0497 0.0555 0.0489 0.0449 0.0475 0.0446
(0.0552) (0.0555) (0.0395) (0.0368) (0.0374) (0.0329)
Constant 0.237* 0.510*** 0.0294 0.259*** 0.148*** 0.304***
(0.136) (0.156) (0.0237) (0.0674) (0.0517) (0.0563)
Observations 13,475 13,457 62,678 62,571 269,419 269,207
R-squared 0.189 0.286 0.134 0.258 0.164 0.301
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
control group Border districts Border districts Neighboring states Neighboring states Major states Major states
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.6: Young firm - started activity in the last 3 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
young young young young young young
post*treat -0.0875 -0.0744 -0.00674 -0.00725 -0.00935 -0.00880
(0.0761) (0.0586) (0.0465) (0.0403) (0.0441) (0.0409)
Constant 0.0320 -0.240 0.354*** 0.105 0.254*** 0.0419
(0.0535) (0.143) (0.0867) (0.126) (0.0672) (0.0761)
Observations 13,487 13,469 62,726 62,616 269,540 269,322
R-squared 0.112 0.165 0.104 0.119 0.083 0.090
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
control group Border districts Border districts Neighboring states Neighboring states Major states Major states
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.7: Self reported to be contracting in size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
contracted contracted contracted contracted contracted contracted
post*treat 0.112 0.0974 0.125* 0.110 0.120* 0.113*
(0.0877) (0.0902) (0.0671) (0.0695) (0.0626) (0.0650)
Constant 0.472** 0.244 0.0974 -0.0118 0.118 0.0967
(0.173) (0.167) (0.0981) (0.107) (0.0866) (0.0921)
Observations 11,102 11,088 53,123 53,023 238,618 238,417
R-squared 0.096 0.103 0.091 0.100 0.096 0.099
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
control group Border districts Border districts Neighboring states Neighboring states Major states Major states
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.8: Probability of registration by firm type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
registered registered registered registered registered registered
post*treat 0.0205 0.0225 0.0250 0.131* 0.128** 0.130***
(0.0582) (0.0410) (0.0392) (0.0648) (0.0494) (0.0466)
Constant 0.0804 0.0757 0.259*** 0.861* 0.495*** 0.683***
(0.156) (0.0494) (0.0485) (0.421) (0.118) (0.0919)
Observations 8,318 36,886 176,212 5,139 25,685 92,995
R-squared 0.205 0.128 0.135 0.447 0.350 0.324
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
control group Border districts Neighboring states Major states Border districts Neighboring states Major states
Sample OAME only OAME only OAME only NDME and DME NDME and DME NDME and DME
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.9: Employment by firm type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log [employment] log [employment] log [employment] log [employment] log [employment] log [employment]
post*treat 0.0186 -0.00220 0.0249 0.0602 0.0623 0.0208
(0.0349) (0.0280) (0.0244) (0.0409) (0.0379) (0.0333)
Constant 0.808*** 0.951*** 1.133*** 0.333 -0.335** -0.248***
(0.133) (0.0606) (0.0493) (0.524) (0.140) (0.0927)
Observations 8,321 36,896 176,258 5,145 25,711 93,050
R-squared 0.161 0.221 0.234 0.717 0.662 0.665
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
control group Border districts Neighboring states Major states Border districts Neighboring states Major states
Sample OAME only OAME only OAME only NDME and DME NDME and DME NDME and DME
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.10: Gross value added by firm type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log [GVA] log [GVA] log [GVA] log [GVA] log [GVA] log [GVA]
post*treat 0.00407 -0.0415 0.0539 0.0177 0.169 0.0671
(0.212) (0.125) (0.117) (0.220) (0.173) (0.147)
Constant 9.109*** 9.520*** 10.47*** 8.892*** 9.246*** 9.776***
(0.602) (0.402) (0.197) (0.768) (0.361) (0.255)
Observations 8,247 36,502 174,661 5,124 25,566 92,574
R-squared 0.462 0.405 0.380 0.478 0.511 0.511
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
control group Border districts Neighboring states Major states Border districts Neighboring states Major states
Sample OAME only OAME only OAME only NDME and DME NDME and DME NDME and DME
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.11: Output by firm type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log [output] log [output] log [output] log [output] log [output] log [output]
post*treat 0.0480 0.0294 0.124 -0.105 0.191 0.0389
(0.229) (0.127) (0.120) (0.245) (0.187) (0.159)
Constant 10.18*** 10.64*** 11.81*** 10.42*** 10.39*** 11.36***
(0.794) (0.473) (0.227) (0.529) (0.420) (0.318)
Observations 8,257 36,543 174,732 5,133 25,589 92,643
R-squared 0.523 0.459 0.455 0.578 0.547 0.519
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
control group Border districts Neighboring states Major states Border districts Neighboring states Major states
Sample OAME only OAME only OAME only NDME and DME NDME and DME NDME and DME
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Labor Regulations and Contract





The Industrial Disputes Act (IDA, 1947) and its various amendments that have made layoffs,
retrenchments, and firm closures harder, has been the focus of many studies on Indian labor
regulations. One strand of literature has found negative economic impacts of amending the
IDA regulations that make it harder to fire workers - lower output, employment, investment,
and productivity in formal manufacturing [Besley and Burgess (2004), Ahsan and Pages
(2009)], lower demand elasticities that respond less to trade reforms [Hasan, Mitra, and Ra-
maswamy (2007)], lower growth in industrial output following delicensing [Aghion, Burgess,
Redding, and Zilibotti (2008)], lower sensitivity of industrial employment to local demand
shocks [Adhvaryu, Chari, and Sharma (2013)] and lower employment in the retail sector
[Amin (2009)].1 Other scholars however, have questioned whether amendments made to the
IDA have increased or decreased flexibility in firing [Bhattacharjea (2006)] or whether these
regulations have even been enforced [Nagaraj (2002)]. There is some evidence that the use
of contract workers (employed through contractors and not directly employed by the firm)
has increased in states with stricter labor regulations because these workers are not covered
by the IDA [Sen, Saha, and Maiti (2010)]. This might be suggestive evidence that firms are
circumventing the labor laws through the use of contract workers. However, there is a lack
of rigorous empirical work investigating the relationship between labor laws and contract
labor use.
In this paper, I test whether firms in stricter labor regulations differentially hire more
contract/temporary workers in response to transitory demand shocks. Specifically, I use
an empirical strategy similar to Adhvaryu, Chari, and Sharma (2013) - (hereafter ACS),
interacting rainfall shocks with various measures of labor regulations to look at employ-
1Fallon and Lucas (1993) looked at a particular amendment to the IDA that required larger firms to seek
permission from the government before retrenchment of workers and found a large drop in employment.
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ment responses of firms. Indian states and districts provide an ideal setting to analyze the
firm-level employment responses to demand shocks in different labor regimes for a number
of reasons. First, different states in India have amended various labor laws to make the
regime either more worker-friendly or employer-friendly, providing variation in labor regu-
lations over space. Secondly, India is still largely an agrarian economy that is dependent
on rainfall. Rainfall shocks directly affect the income and consumption levels of households
through their effect on agricultural production. Finally, India has detailed firm-level panel
data that can be used to analyze responses of firms to demand shocks across labor regimes. I
use labor regulation measures constructed by Besley and Burgess (2004) and Gupta, Hasan,
and Kumar (2009) that vary cross sectionally over states/districts. I find that compared
to firms in more flexible labor regimes, those in more restrictive labor regimes hire more
contract workers (not covered under IDA) in response to demand shocks. There is no dif-
ferential response in the hiring of permanent workers (covered by the IDA regulations) by
firms across labor regimes (in response to shocks). This suggests that firms in stricter labor
regimes might be hiring contract workers to get around the strict labor laws.
This paper is closely related to ACS, who use state-industry and district-level data2 to
find that total employment in states/districts with more flexible labor regimes are more re-
sponsive to demand shocks. However, it is more appropriate to use firm-level panel data to
look at the employment responses of firms to demand shocks rather than studying aggre-
gated industrial outcomes. In this paper, I use the Indian firm-level panel dataset from 1998
to 2008, that allows me to control for time invariant firm characteristics. Furthermore, in
contrast to the ACS dataset, the firm-level panel data divides total employment into workers
hired directly by the firm and workers hired through contractors (contract workers). This
2They aggregate three years of firm level data from 1987, 1990, and 1994 to construct a district-level data
set.
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distinction is central to this paper because the IDA regulations only affect directly hired
workers and firms are thus free to hire and fire contract workers at will. Moreover, the
firm-level data set can be used to look at firm size cutoffs as an additional measure of labor
regulation.3
This paper adds to existing work on cross-country analysis of the effects of labor reg-
ulations on employment [Botero, Djankov, Porta, and Lopez-De-Silanes (2004), Micco and
Pages (2006), Kahn (2007)], within-country analysis of employment protection on produc-
tivity [Autor, Kerr, and Kugler (2007), Dougherty, Robles, and Krishna (2011)], and reg-
ulation enforcement on firm size and informality [Almeida and Carneiro (2012), Almeida
and Carneiro (2009)]. The results of this paper are also broadly related to theoretical work
on employment protection and temporary workers in the European context [Blanchard and
Landier (2002), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002)].
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses labor laws in India. Then,
Section 3.3 discusses the empirical strategy, Section 3.4 describes the data and the results,
and robustness are discussed in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Labor Laws in India
The Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947 is the core of labor laws in India and covers
various aspects such as resolution of industrial disputes by setting up tribunals and labor
courts, hiring and firing workers, closure of establishments, strikes and lockouts etc. in
the formal sector. Although the IDA was passed by the federal government, it has been
amended several times by state governments. Some amendments have made the states more
3This allows me to address the Bhattacharjea (2006) critique of the Besley and Burgess (2004) labor
regulation measure.
96
employer-friendly by making it easier to hire and fire workers and some have made them
more worker-friendly by increasing job security for laborers. Through these amendments,
different states in India have developed different labor regimes.
Layoffs and retrenchments are covered under Sections V-A and V-B of the IDA. Section
V-A lays down regulations for establishments with 50 or more workers.4 For example, a
retrenched worker is entitled to compensation equaling 15 days’ average pay for each year
of service and for layoffs, every worker is paid fifty percent of basic wages and a dearness
allowance for each day that they are laid off (maximum of 45 days).5 Regulations in Section
V-B cover all establishments with 100 or more workers. This section is more stringent and
requires firms to take government permission to lay-off or retrench a single worker. Closing
down of establishments also requires sixty days (Section V-A) or ninety days (Section V-B)
of prior notification with the government. Both these sections of the IDA make it costly for
firms to fire workers.
IDA regulations however, do not cover contract workers and casual workers. Contract
workers are hired through contractors and are hence not directly on the payrolls of the
principal employing firm. Contract workers are also generally paid lesser than permanent
workers and are not covered by trade unions. Firms are free to hire and fire contract workers
as market conditions change without being subject to the provisions of the IDA. Figure 3.1
shows the growth in the use of contract workers across states with different labor regulations.
There has clearly been a large increase in the use of contract workers by firms.
4See Malik (2007) for details.
5For layoffs - workers need to be given a month’s notice.
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3.3 Data
In this paper, I use (i) Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) firm-level panel data set from
1998-2008, (ii) Rainfall data from Terrestrial Precipitation: 1900-2010 Gridded Monthly
Time Series (version 3.01), Center for Climatic Research, University of Delaware, (iii) Labor
regulation measures from Besley and Burgess (2004) and (Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar (2009)
and (iv) National Sample Survey (NSS) employment-unemployment rounds from 1999-2000,
2004-05 and 2009-10.
The firm-level panel data comes from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), conducted
by the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (MoSPI) in India. The ASI
covers all registered industrial units, which includes units with 10 or more workers and use
electricity, or have least 20 workers but do not use electricity. The ASI frame is divided into
census (surveyed every year) and sample (sampled every few years) sectors. The definition
of these two sectors, however, has undergone some changes over the years. The census
sector covers all firms in five industrially backward states (Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland,
Tripura, and Andaman and Nicobar Islands) and large factories. In the ASI, the definition
of a large factory to be covered in the census sector has changed from 200 or more employees
(1998-2000) to 100 or more employees (2001 onwards). The rest of the firms are covered in
the sample sector. A third of these firms are randomly selected in the survey each year. The
reference year for the ASI is the accounting year from 1st April of the previous year to 31st
March of the next year. For example, data from 2004-05 will include the period from 1st
April 2004 to 31st March 2005. In this paper, I restrict the sample to the major states and
remove Jammu & Kashmir and the states in the north-east namely Manipur, Meghalaya,
Nagaland and Tripura and the union territories. This data set is well suited for this paper
as it has employment broken down by permanent and contract workers at the firm level.
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Furthermore, I restrict the data to cover only the manufacturing sector firms and do not
include firms involved in agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying,
electricity, gas and water supply, construction, wholesale and retail trade or services. For
the employment variables, I “winsorize” by setting the value above the 99th percentile to
the value at the 99th percentile, thereby reducing the influence of outliers.
I use rainfall data from Terrestrial Precipitation: 1900-2010 Gridded Monthly Time Series
(version 3.01) collected by Center for Climatic Research, University of Delaware. The rainfall
data is available for 0.5 by 0.5 degree latitude-longitude grids and this is matched to the
geographic center of each district. The rainfall measure used in this paper is the rainfall in
the previous calendar year. For example, to correspond to the ASI accounting year from 1st
April 2004 to 31st March 2005, I use rainfall measures from January 2003-December 2003.
This gives firms time to respond to demand shocks arising from the effects of rainfall on
the local economy. I define rainfall shocks in the same way as Jayachandran (2006), Kaur
(2012), and ACS where
rainfall shock=

1 if rainfall in the district is above the 80th percentile
0 if rainfall in the district is between the 20th and 80th percentile
−1 if rainfall in the district is below the 20th percentile
This definition follows from the basic logic that higher (lower) rainfall is associated with
higher (lower) crop yields as is clearly elucidated in Kaur (2012).
Labor regulations measures used in this paper come from two sources - Besley and Burgess
(2004)(BB henceforth) and (Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar (2009) (GHK henceforth). BB code
each state level amendment made to the IDA between 1958-92 as being either pro-worker
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(+1), neutral (0), or pro-employer (-1). A pro-worker (pro-employer) amendment was one
that decreased (increased) a firm’s flexibility in hiring and firing of workers while a neutral
amendment left it unchanged. The cumulated sum of these scores in all previous years would
determine the state’s labor regime in a particular year. ACS use the same methodology and
only change the code for Karnataka from neutral to pro-employer based on an amendment
in 1987. I follow ACS and BB and use the following categorizations: “pro-worker states”
- West Bengal, Maharashtra, Orissa, “pro-employer states”- Rajasthan, Karnataka, Kerala,
Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat6 and “neutral states” - Punjab, Haryana, Hi-
machal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Assam, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and
Madhya Pradesh. Hence this measure of labor regulation varies both across states and over
time. I also use the composite measure of labor regulation compiled by GHK that takes
into account the various labor regulation measures in different papers such as BB, Ahsan
and Pages (2009) and Bhattacharjea (2006) and uses a simple majority rule to assign codes
to states. Following this GHK code states as follows: “pro-worker states” - West Bengal,
Maharashtra, Orissa, “pro-employer states”- Rajasthan, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu,
Andhra Pradesh and “neutral states” - Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand,
Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Assam, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Goa, Gujarat
and Kerala. This measure of labor regulation thus only varies cross sectionally. Finally,
I use firm size cutoffs based on the IDA legislations of 50 and 100 permanent workers as
additional measures of labor regulations.
To look at measures like monthly per capital consumption expenditure, agricultural
wages, and industrial wages, I use the 55th (1999-2000), 61st (2004-05) and 66th (2009-
6Gujarat was coded as pro-worker in ACS. All accounts suggest that this coding was incorrect as it
was based on a single amendment in 1973 that had an ambiguous effect. I begin by coding Gujarat as a
neutral state and then code it as pro-employer after 2004, when the state passed the SEZ Act and provided
exemptions from Chapter VB of IDA. See Malik (2007) and Ahsan and Pages (2009) for details.
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10) Employment/Unemployment rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS). These are
nationally representative household surveys conducted by the Ministry of Statistics and Pro-
gram Implementation (MoSPI) in India. These surveys provide information on wages for
each household member in the seven days preceding the interview. I use the National Indus-
trial Classification (NIC) codes to construct industrial and agricultural wages.
The summary statistics for these different datasets are shown in Table 3.1. The summary
statistics are divided by different labor regulations - pro-worker, neutral, and pro-employer.
Pro-worker states have a larger number of permanent and contract workers per firm as com-
pared to firms in neutral or pro-employer states. However, positive and negative rainfall
shocks are of similar magnitude across the three regimes. Figure 3.2 provides visual evi-
dence that the industrial distribution across labor regimes is similar, thereby suggesting that
the effect of rainfall across regimes will not be different.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
In this paper, I test the employment response of firms located in different labor regimes to
transitory demand shocks. Before looking at firm-level outcomes it is important to determine
whether rainfall shocks represent a demand shock or a labor supply shock for firms. A
rainfall shock can induce opposing effects on firms. For example, a good rainfall might lead
to higher agricultural income and a larger demand for industrial goods (a demand shock) or
it might lead to a higher demand for agricultural labor (a labor supply shock for industrial
labor). However, as long as rainfall shocks are exogenous to the labor regime and firms’
employment decisions, and represent comparable shocks across labor regimes, they should
be valid exogenous shocks to firms’ employment decisions. Jayachandran (2006), Kaur (2012)
and Adhvaryu, Chari, and Sharma (2013) have shown that a good rainfall is associated with
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higher agricultural yields. Given the direct effects of rainfall on agricultural yields, I then
test whether rainfall shocks affect other outcomes such as monthly consumption expenditure
of households, wages of agricultural workers, and wages of industrial workers (via the effect
on agricultural yields). I use regressions of the form:
ydt = δd + λt + α(rainshockdt) + εdt (3.1)
where δd and λt represent district and time fixed effects respectively. The coefficient α on
rainshockdt represents the direct effect of rainfall shocks on outcomes such as monthly con-
sumption expenditure of households, wages of agricultural workers, and wages of industrial
workers. These regressions separate out the demand and labor supply effects of rainfall on
industrial firms. If monthly per capita expenditure and industrial wages increase as a re-
sponse to rainfall, it would be suggestive evidence that the rainfall shocks represent demand
shocks for firms. On the other hand, if agricultural wages also increase in response to rainfall
shocks, it might attract more workers into agriculture causing a negative labor supply shock
on firms.
To test the employment response of firms, I run regressions similar to ACS of the form:
yidt = θi + λt + β0rainshockdt + β1(rainshockdt × Proworkerdt)
+β2(rainshockdt × Proemployerdt) + εidt (3.2)
where θi represents firm fixed effects (and subsumes district and state fixed effects). This
regression looks at the impact of demand shocks on firms across different labor regimes, with
states/districts with neutral labor laws being the omitted category. The coefficient β1 on the
interaction between the rainfall shock and an indicator for a district with pro-worker labor
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laws shows the differential effect of firms in pro-worker labor regimes as compared to neutral
labor regimes. Similarly β2 measures the differential effect of a demand shock on a firm in a
district with pro-employer laws compared to a firm in a neutral district.
Finally, I run triple differences regressions (DIDID) of the form:
yidt = β1(rainshockdt × Proworkerdt × Largeidt)
+β2(rainshockdt × Proemployerdt × Largeidt)
+β3(rainshockdt × Proworkerdt ×Mediumidt)
+β4(rainshockdt × Proemployerdt ×Mediumidt)
+β5(rainshockdt × Proworkerdt × Smallidt)
+β6(rainshockdt × Proemployerdt × Smallidt)
+θi + λt + δrk + δk + εidt (3.3)
where the size categories are defined as follows: Smallidt - less than 50 permanent work-
ers, Mediumidt - between 50 and 100 permanent workers, and Largeidt - more than 100
permanent workers. In this regression specification, δrk represents rainfall shocks interacted
with size dummies and δk represents size dummies. This triple difference specification tests
whether rainfall shocks affect firms of different sizes differently across labor regimes. For
example, IDA regulations do not apply to small firms and hence we should not expect any
differential response across pro-worker and pro-employer states in terms of hiring of contract
workers. If IDA regulations are binding, we would expect to see differential hiring of contract
workers by medium and large firms as opposed to small firms.
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3.5 Results
A rainfall shock may represent a demand shock or a labor supply shock for manufacturing
firms. Higher rainfall would lead to higher agricultural production (see Jayachandran (2006),
Kaur (2012) and ACS), which in turn would increase household income levels. This increase
in household incomes may lead to higher demand for industrial goods and higher demand for
workers by firms, thereby causing an increase in industrial wages. On the other hand, a good
rainfall might increase the demand for agricultural labor and raise agricultural wages, leading
to a negative labor supply shock for firms. To test whether a rainfall shock is a demand or a
labor supply shock, I run regressions looking at the direct effect of rainfall shocks (lagged) on
outcomes like monthly per capita expenditure, agricultural and industrial wages. If higher
rainfall increases monthly per capita expenditure and industrial wages, it must be a demand
shock for firms working via its effect on agricultural production. However, if rainfall shocks
increase agricultural wages, the labor supply channel might also be at work.
In Table 3.2, all columns show the outcome variable of interest regressed on lagged
rainfall shocks and includes district and year fixed effects. Year fixed effects control for any
macroeconomic shocks affecting the entire country, and district fixed effects control for time
invariant district characteristics. Note that the rainfall shock variable takes values -1, 0,
and 1, and is increasing in the amount of rainfall. Hence, a positive coefficient on rainfall
shock in the regressions implies a positive association with rainfall. Column 1, shows that a
higher rainfall is associated with higher monthly per capita expenditure. In Columns 2 and
3, I look at the impact of rainfall shocks on agricultural and industrial wages respectively.
I find that rainfall does not affect agricultural wages7 in Column 2. In Column 3, I find
that industrial wages increase with higher rainfall. Taken together, the three columns show
7ACS also find a weak and statistically insignificant effect of rainfall on agricultural wages.
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that rainfall increases household consumption expenditure and industrial wages but has no
effect on agricultural wages. This suggests that rainfall shocks represent demand shocks for
firms in this setting. I now look at the impact of these transitory demand shocks on the
employment responses of firms located across labor regimes.
In Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, I look at the effect of lagged rainfall shocks and lagged
rainfall shocks interacted with various measures of labor regulations at the district level
on total workers, contract workers, and permanent workers in the firm. I use the actual
number of different kinds of workers as opposed to logarithms because some firms hire zero
contract workers in many years. All columns include firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and
control for age and age squared. The firm fixed effects control for time invariant firm-level
characteristics, that might be important confounders while analyzing employment responses
of firms. Column 1 looks at the direct effect of lagged rainfall on the outcome variable of
interest. In Columns 2 and 3, I interact lagged rainfall with the BB and GHK measures of
labor regulations respectively. The omitted category of labor regime is a neutral state in
both Columns 2 and 3.
In Table 3.3, Column 1, I look at the direct effect of lagged rainfall shocks on total
number of workers in the firm, and find a statistically insignificant effect. Columns 2 and 3,
looks at the effect of rainfall shocks interacted with various measures of labor regulations,
and I find no differential effect on firms in pro-employer districts as compared to neutral or
pro-worker districts. However, it is possible that faced with demand shocks, firms adjust by
changing the number of contract workers because there are no firing restrictions for them,
and leave the number of permanent workers unchanged.
In Table 3.4, I look at the impact on contract workers. As mentioned earlier, IDA
regulations do not cover contract workers, and firms are free to hire and fire contract workers
according to their needs. We would thus expect to see firms adjusting the number of contract
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workers, when faced with demand shocks. Column 1, confirms this. In Column 1, I find that
firms increase the number of contract workers on average when there is more rainfall. For
instance, moving from the 80th percentile to the 20th percentile of the rainfall distribution,
increases the number of contract workers hired by a firm by 0.75. In Columns 2 and 3,
I look at the impact of rainfall shocks on the hiring of contract workers by firms located
in different labor regimes. In Column 2, I find that coefficient on the interaction between
lagged rainfall shock and an indicator for pro-worker districts (BB measure) is positive and
statistically significant. The coefficient shows that faced with a demand shock, firms in a
pro-worker labor regime hire 3.03 additional contract workers as compared to firms in neutral
states. The coefficient on the interaction between lagged rainfall shock and the pro-employer
indicator is not statistically significant. This implies that firms in pro-employer states do
not respond to demand shocks by hiring/firing more contract workers relative to firms in
neutral states. This might be because they have more flexibility in the hiring and firing of
permanent workers and do not need to rely more on contract workers. Column 3, shows
a similar relationship for the interaction between rainfall shocks and the GHK measure of
labor regulations. The column shows that firms in pro-worker states differentially hire more
contract workers (around 3.4 additional workers) as compared to firms in neutral states
when faced with a demand shock. Furthermore, firms in pro-employer states do not show a
differential response to firms in neutral states. Taken together, the results imply that firms
in pro-worker states differentially adjust the number of contract workers when faced with a
demand shock, whereas firms in pro-employer states do not.
In Table 3.5, I look at the impact on permanent workers. Permanent workers, once hired
are not easy to fire, especially in pro-worker states and hence firms may not want to adjust
their numbers in response to transitory demand shocks. In Column 1, I find no direct effect
of rainfall shocks on the hiring/firing of permanent workers. In Columns 2 and 3, I find no
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differential effects of rainfall shocks on firms located in pro-worker states as compared to
firms in pro-employer states. These results imply that firms do not adjust on the margin of
permanent workers when they are faced with transitory shocks.
In Table 3.6, I analyze the adjustment of contract laborers by firms separately for rural
and urban firms. Since rainfall shocks affect local incomes and demand through their effect
on agricultural production, we would expect a larger impact of these shocks on rural firms.
Table 3.6 confirms this prediction. Columns 1 through 3 restrict the sample to rural firms.
In Column 1, I find that rainfall shocks directly affect the number of contract workers hired
by rural firms, and Columns 2 and 3, show that the firms in pro-worker regimes respond to
transitory shocks by hiring more contract workers (3.7 to 4.3 additional contract workers) as
compared to firms in neutral regimes. I find no differential effect on the hiring of contract
workers by firms in pro-employer states relative to firms in neutral states. Columns 4 through
6 restrict the sample for urban firms. In Column 4, I find that the direct effect of rainfall on
contract worker hiring is not statistically significant for urban firms. Columns 5 and 6, show
the differential effect of rainfall shocks on urban firms in pro-worker districts as compared
to pro-employer districts. Firms in pro-worker regimes hire more contract workers relative
to neutral states (between 2.3 and 2.6 contract workers), but the magnitude is smaller than
rural firms. Since the results are stronger for firms in rural areas than in urban areas, these
results provide additional supporting evidence that the rainfall shocks are demand shocks
working via their effects on agriculture.
Table 3.7 then breaks down the rainfall shocks into positive (rainfall above the 80th
percentile) and negative shocks (rainfall below the 20th percentile) and also looks at the
impact of the interaction between these shocks and measures of labor regulation on the
employment decisions of rural firms. In Column 1, I find that a positive rainfall shock leads
to firms hiring more contract workers on average and a negative shock leads to more firing of
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contract workers, although these results are not statistically significant. In Columns 2 and
3, I find that the firms in pro-worker states hire more contract workers as compared to those
in neutral states in response to a positive rainfall shock (7.3 to 7.5 additional workers), but
firms in pro-employer states do not show any differential response relative to firms in neutral
regimes. Although the coefficient on a negative rainfall shock interacted with an indicator
for pro-worker districts is negative, the effect is statistically insignificant. The effects are
also statistically insignificant for interactions of positive and rainfall shocks with indicators
of pro-employer labor regulations. This suggests that most of the effects of rainfall shocks are
being driven by positive shocks on firms in pro-worker regimes. In Table 3.8, I find a direct
effect of rainfall shocks on wages of contract workers. However, I find no differential effects
on the wages of contract workers in firms in pro-worker states as compared to pro-employer
states.
In Table 3.9, I test whether the differential effect between firms in pro-worker districts
and pro-employer districts in terms of hiring of contract workers is different for larger firms
as opposed to smaller firms. These are regressions similar to triple differences regressions. I
define the size categories as follows - small (below 50 permanent workers), medium (between
50 and 100 workers), and large (greater than 100 workers). We would expect no difference
in the hiring/firing of contract workers by small firms since IDA regulations do not apply
to firms with less than 50 permanent workers. Table 3.9 confirms this for the number of
contract workers (Column 1) and man days of contract workers employed (Column 2). The
coefficient on the triple interaction of rainfall shocks, an indicator for the labor regime,
and an indicator for the size category of the firm is only significant for large and medium
firms in pro-worker states. This implies that medium and large firms in pro-worker states
differentially hire more contract workers as compared to such firms in pro-employer states.
I also explicitly test whether firms of different size categories have differential employment
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responses in different labor regimes. I find that there is no difference between small firms
across labor regimes, but large and medium firms hire differentially more contract workers
in pro-worker states. The table also shows that the difference-in-differences between large
and small firms, and between medium and small firms is also statistically significant. This
implies that medium and large firms have different employment responses when faced with
rainfall shocks as compared to small firms.
3.6 Robustness
In this section, I check whether the main results are robust to different specifications. First,
there might be a concern that different states trend differentially in terms of economic vari-
ables. These differential trends might then cause the differential response in hiring behavior
of firms across labor regimes. In Table 3.10, I control for state specific time trends in the
regression specification. Column 1 confirms that rainfall shocks have a direct effect on the
hiring of contract workers by firms. Columns 2 and 3 look at the differential response of
firms across labor regimes in the hiring of contract workers. In columns 2 and 3, I find that
firms in pro-worker regimes differentially hire more contract workers than firms in neutral
regimes (between 2.2 and 2.6 additional contract workers depending on choice of labor reg-
ulation measure). I find no differential effect in the hiring behavior of contract workers in
pro-employer states in comparison to firms in neutral states.
A second concern relates to the non-random location decisions of firms. Firms might de-
cide to locate in a particular state depending on whether the labor regime is pro-employer or
pro-worker. This in turn may result in different industrial composition in different states and
cause differential response of firms to demand shocks. I address this concern in Table 3.11.
In columns 1, and 2, I interact rainfall shocks with 3-digit industry indicator variables, and
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in columns 3, and 4, state×3-digit industry fixed effects are included. I find that across
the four columns, firms in pro-worker regimes differentially hire more contract workers than
firms in neutral states. However, firms in pro-employer states show no differential response.
Finally, in Table 3.12, I control for baseline characteristics such as the gini coefficient
(including landless laborers) in 1997,8 average size per holding of agricultural land in 1995-
96,9 and cumulative years (in 1997) since 1957 that hard left parties were in majority in
the state legislature.10 In columns 1, 2, and 3, I interact the control variables with a time
dummy and in columns 4, and 5, the control variables are interacted with rainfall shocks. In
columns 1 through 3, I also control for industry×year fixed effects and in columns 4, and 5,
3-digit industry indicator variables are interacted with rainfall shocks. The results remain
stable across specifications and show that firms in pro-worker states differentially hire more
contract workers in response to rainfall shocks.
3.7 Conclusion
Over the years, different states in India have amended the regulations of the Industrial
Disputes Act, making them either more worker-friendly or more employer-friendly. In pro-
worker states as compared to pro-employer states, once a worker is hired on the firm’s payroll
(permanent worker), it is relatively difficult to fire them. However, these labor regulations
are not applicable to the number of workers hired by firms through contractors (contract
workers). Although it has been argued that contract workers provide flexibility to firms in
8This variable is available on the EOPP Indian States Database and also used in Besley and Burgess
(2004).
9Available from the Agricultural Census 1995-96.
10Data used in Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2008) and available from the American Economic
Review website.
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their hiring and firing decisions as they are faced with changing demand conditions, previous
empirical work has not shown this rigorously.
In this paper, I empirically test whether firms located in different labor regimes differ-
entially hire contract workers, when they face demand shocks. I use an empirical strategy
similar to Adhvaryu, Chari, and Sharma (2013), where I interact rainfall shocks with dif-
ferent measures of labor regulation and look at the impact on firm-level employment. The
firm-level panel dataset I use, allows me to separate a firm’s total employment into perma-
nent and contract workers. I find that faced with transitory demand shocks, firms located
in pro-worker labor regimes differentially hire more contract workers as compared to firms
in pro-employer regimes. There is however, no difference in the hiring/firing of permanent
workers across labor regimes in response to demand shocks. This suggests that the category
of contract workers has indeed added more flexibility to firms’ hiring decisions, especially in
regions where there are restrictions on the firing of permanent workers.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variables Pro-worker Neutral Pro-employer
Total Workers 119.876 94.497 110.295
[221.287] [186.474] [194.934]
Permanent Workers 92.765 72.606 90.38703
[193.903] [160.952] [174.058]
Contract Workers 27.110 21.89 19.908
[72.525] [64.651] [63.781]
% using contract workers 0.324 0.275 0.249
[0.468] [0.447] [0.433]
Positive rainfall shock 0.121 0.135 0.137
[0.326] [0.342] [0.344]
Negative rainfall shock 0.126 0.122 0.122
[0.332] [0.327] [0.287]
Contract wages 33575.75 27944.19 28069.92
(per year) [21452.49] [17096.31] [17847.79]
Firm-year observations 60,000 129,281 130,644
Monthly per capita consumption 948.13 955.18 899.12
expenditure (mpce) [1152.3] [1012.3] [899.15]
Agricultural wages 234.48 303.36 265.86
(per week) [207.41] [304.71] [648.14]
Industrial wages 889.39 820.23 659.25
(per week) [1803.53] [1086.48] [939.18]
Standard deviation in square brackets.
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Table 3.2: Direct effect of rainfall shocks
(1) (2) (3)
monthly per agricultural industrial
capita expenditure wages wages
Rainshock (t-1) 91.45*** 0.515 110.3*
(25.94) (5.553) (62.09)
Constant 578.8*** 195.0*** 491.0***
(1.562) (0.627) (8.447)
Observations 300,632 72,158 32,925
R-squared 0.161 0.028 0.168
Year FE YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.3: Total workers
(1) (2) (3)
total workers total workers total workers
Rainshock (t-1) 0.788 0.862 0.234
(0.750) (1.046) (1.147)
Rainshock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states (BB) -0.580
(1.927)
Pro-worker states (BB) 0.893
(2.404)
Pro-employer states (GHK) 0.737
(2.149)
Pro-worker states (GHK) 1.525
(2.547)
Constant 89.36*** 89.40*** 89.37***
(2.638) (2.650) (2.648)
Observations 311,348 311,348 311,348
R-squared 0.917 0.917 0.917
firm FE YES YES YES
year FE YES YES YES
Age controls YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
114
Table 3.4: Contract workers
(1) (2) (3)
contract workers contract workers contract workers
Rainshock (t-1) 0.749* 0.342 -0.0484
(0.444) (0.670) (0.960)
Rainshock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states (BB) -0.321
(0.843)
Pro-worker states (BB) 3.033**
(1.336)
Pro-employer states (GHK) 0.500
(1.303)
Pro-worker states (GHK) 3.425**
(1.567)
Constant 13.60*** 13.69*** 13.67***
(1.547) (1.547) (1.544)
Observations 311,348 311,348 311,348
R-squared 0.779 0.779 0.779
firm FE YES YES YES
year FE YES YES YES
Age controls YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.5: Permanent workers
(1) (2) (3)
permanent workers permanent workers permanent workers
Rainshock (t-1) 0.0389 0.520 0.282
(0.789) (1.262) (1.676)
Rainshock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states (BB) -0.259
(1.703)
Pro-worker states (BB) -2.140
(2.026)
Pro-employer states (GHK) 0.238
(2.446)
Pro-worker states (GHK) -1.901
(2.386)
Constant 75.76*** 75.72*** 75.71***
(3.029) (3.049) (3.044)
Observations 311,348 311,348 311,348
R-squared 0.916 0.916 0.916
firm FE YES YES YES
year FE YES YES YES
Age controls YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.6: Rural and Urban Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
contract workers contract workers contract workers contract workers contract workers contract workers
Rainshock (t-1) 1.183** 0.925 0.349 0.638 0.216 -0.0604
(0.575) (0.834) (0.799) (0.562) (0.866) (1.339)
Rainshock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states (BB) -0.806 -0.0633
(1.322) (0.908)
Pro-worker states (BB) 3.775* 2.355*
(2.065) (1.294)
Pro-employer states (GHK) 0.282 0.542
(1.404) (1.697)
Pro-worker states (GHK) 4.373** 2.624
(2.162) (1.689)
Constant 16.36*** 16.46*** 16.43*** 12.42*** 12.49*** 12.48***
(1.815) (1.799) (1.798) (2.021) (2.033) (2.028)
Observations 121,122 121,122 121,122 190,193 190,193 190,193
R-squared 0.794 0.795 0.795 0.793 0.793 0.793
firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Age controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Rural Rural Rural Urban Urban Urban
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.7: Asymmetric effects
(1) (2) (3)
contract workers contract workers contract workers
Positive shock (t-1) 1.533 0.249 0.105
(0.979) (1.304) (1.159)
Negative shock (t-1) x -0.832 -1.425 -0.578
(0.674) (1.197) (1.052)
Positive shock (t-1) x
Pro-worker states (BB) 7.357*
(3.778)
Negative shock (t-1) x
Pro-worker states (BB) -0.598
(1.950)
Positive shock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states (BB) 0.239
(1.853)
Negative shock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states (BB) 1.672
(1.674)
Positive shock (t-1) x
Pro-worker states (GHK) 7.507*
(3.944)
Negative shock (t-1) x
Pro-worker states (GHK) -1.425
(1.886)
Positive shock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states (GHK) 0.547
(2.106)
Negative shock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states (GHK) -0.0554
(1.545)
Constant 16.30*** 16.45*** 16.43***
(1.842) (1.812) (1.809)
Observations 121,122 121,122 121,122
R-squared 0.794 0.795 0.795
firm FE YES YES YES
year FE YES YES YES
Age controls YES YES YES
Sample Rural Rural Rural
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.8: Wages of contract workers in rural firms
(1) (2) (3)
wages wages wages
(contract workers) (contract workers) (contract workers)
Rainshock (t-1) 436.1* 655.4 671.5*
(260.9) (402.0) (395.3)
Rainshock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states (BB) -571.1
(649.5)
Pro-worker states (BB) -97.60
(598.9)
Pro-employer states (GHK) -614.8
(539.4)
Pro-worker states (GHK) -103.9
(594.8)
Constant 24,826*** 24,842*** 24,841***
(914.2) (912.6) (913.7)
Observations 40,964 40,964 40,964
R-squared 0.704 0.704 0.704
firm FE YES YES YES
year FE YES YES YES
Age controls YES YES YES
Sample Rural Rural Rural
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.9: Size regressions
(1) (2)
contract workers mandays (contract workers)
Rainshock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states x Small factory -0.500 -173.4
(0.947) (295.5)
Pro-worker states x Small factory 0.606 225.0
(0.852) (268.0)
Pro-employer states x Medium factory -2.505 -782.8
(1.916) (612.9)
Pro-worker states x Medium factory 4.915* 1,621*
(2.671) (884.1)
Pro-employer states x Large factory -0.696 -293.6
(2.114) (681.6)




size dummies YES YES
rain shock x size dummy YES YES
firm FE YES YES
year FE YES YES
Age controls YES YES
Sample ALL ALL
Response of small firms across labor regimes 1.61 2.04
[0.2054] [0.1540]
Response of medium firms across labor regimes 7.77 7.29
[0.0055***] [0.0071***]
Response of large firms across labor regimes 4.11 3.88
[0.0431**] [0.0495**]
Diff-in-diff for large firms relative to small 2.74 2.41
[0.0985*] [0.1216]
Diff-in-diff for medium firms relative to small 6.49 5.83
[0.0112**] [0.0161**]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.10: Robustness - state-specific time trend
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES contract workers contract workers contract workers
Rainshock (t-1) 0.551* 0.325 -0.0474
(0.320) (0.563) (0.628)
Rainshock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states (BB) -0.410
(0.775)
Pro-worker states (BB) 2.206**
(1.027)
Pro-employer states (GHK) 0.364
(0.921)
Pro-worker states (GHK) 2.578**
(1.072)
Constant -1,415* -1,391* -1,365*
(832.3) (827.4) (816.0)
Observations 311,348 311,348 311,348
R-squared 0.779 0.779 0.779
firm FE YES YES YES
year FE YES YES YES
Age controls YES YES YES
State-specific trend YES YES YES
Sample ALL ALL ALL
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.11: Robustness - industrial composition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES contract workers contract workers contract workers contract workers
Rainshock (t-1) -3.382 -3.716 0.390 -0.0141
(2.523) (2.568) (0.678) (0.967)
Rainshock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states (BB) 0.0507 -0.361
(0.928) (0.853)
Pro-worker states (BB) 3.051** 3.066**
(1.257) (1.333)
Pro-employer states (GHK) 0.753 0.482
(1.316) (1.309)
Pro-worker states (GHK) 3.366** 3.471**
(1.418) (1.564)
Constant 17.54*** 17.52*** 11.93 6.054
(3.718) (3.715) (7.799) (5.485)
Observations 311,348 311,348 311,348 311,348
R-squared 0.779 0.779 0.780 0.780
firm FE YES YES YES YES
year FE YES YES YES YES
Age controls YES YES YES YES
industry×rainshock YES YES NO NO
state×industry FE NO NO YES YES
Sample ALL ALL ALL ALL
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.12: Robustness - controlling for baseline characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES contract workers contract workers contract workers contract workers contract workers
Rainshock (t-1) 0.862* 0.599 0.145 -2.608 -1.952
(0.478) (0.918) (1.301) (5.629) (5.531)
Rainshock (t-1) x
Pro-employer states (BB) -0.680 -0.000813
(0.949) (0.996)
Pro-worker states (BB) 3.049** 4.075***
(1.443) (1.542)
Pro-employer states (GHK) 0.117 0.780
(1.551) (1.482)
Pro-worker states (GHK) 3.517** 4.490***
(1.761) (1.723)
Constant 17.02** 17.13** 17.14** 18.03*** 17.96***
(6.725) (6.728) (6.721) (4.280) (4.265)
Observations 267,280 267,280 267,280 267,280 267,280
R-squared 0.780 0.780 0.780 0.777 0.777
firm FE YES YES YES YES YES
year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Age controls YES YES YES YES YES
Industry×year FE YES YES YES NO NO
Controls×time dummies YES YES YES NO NO
Controls×rainshock NO NO NO YES YES
Industry dummies×rainshock NO NO NO YES YES
Sample ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the district level.
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Assume that a firm i in industry j at time t has a Cobb-Douglas production function
yijt = α + βl(ljt) + βp(pjt) + βm(mjt) + βk(kjt) + ωijt + εijt
where y is output, l is labor, p is power and electricity expenditure, and m is expenditure
on raw materials (all variables in logarithms). The simultaneity problem arises because firms
observe their own productivity ωijt, before choosing their inputs of power, labor and other
raw materials. However, this is not observable to the econometrician. Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) use raw material expenditure (mijt) as a proxy for the unobserved productivity shock.
They show that if these raw material inputs are monotonic in the firm’s productivity at all
levels of capital, then it can be inverted to express productivity in terms of capital and raw
materials.
ωijt = ωjt(mijt, kijt)
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This function can then be inserted into the equation above. Then the estimation takes
place in two stages. In the first stage, a flexible functional form of capital and raw materials
is included and the coefficients on l and p are estimated using semi-parametric techniques.
The second stage uses GMM techniques to recover the coefficients on k and m.1
I use this method to estimate production function parameters separately for each 2 digit
industry. Then, I use these estimates to construct firm-level productivity measures.
1For details, see Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
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Table A1: List of bordering districts
Himachal Pradesh Uttarakhand Uttar Pradesh Haryana Punjab
Sirmaur Udham Singh Nagar Pilibhit Yamunanagar Pathankot
Solan Nainital Bareilly Ambala Hoshiarpur
Bilaspur Pauri Rampur Panchkula Rupnagar
Una Haridwar Moradabad - SAS Nagar
Kangra Dehradun Bijnor - Gurdaspur
Chamba - Muzzafarnagar - -
- - Saharanpur - -
Table A2: State-level price index for neighboring states
States 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
Himachal Pradesh 1.00 1.04 1.09 1.15 1.16 1.19 1.23 1.26 1.30
Uttarakhand 1.00 1.02 1.06 1.13 1.16 1.18 1.25 1.35 1.42
Haryana 1.00 1.05 1.09 1.14 1.18 1.23 1.28 1.36 1.49
Punjab 1.00 1.07 1.11 1.13 1.15 1.18 1.25 1.33 1.47
Uttar Pradesh 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.09 1.13 1.17 1.24 1.32 1.40
Chandigarh 1.00 1.03 1.09 1.14 1.19 1.28 1.39 1.46 1.51
Delhi 1.00 1.04 1.09 1.11 1.17 1.21 1.26 1.32 1.38
Notes: These deflators have been calculated using the state GDP at current and constant prices from the RBI Handbook of
Statistics on the Indian Economy. Base year: 1999-2000.
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Table A3a: State weights in the synthetic ‘treated’ group
State Weight





Dadra & NH 0.034





















Literacy rate 74.05 77.2577
Number of workers 3063249 3302985
Main workers 2143115 2463767
Marginal workers 920134 839217.7
Cultivators 1762493 1560680
Agricultural laborers 176927 532634
Household industrial workers 62483.5 85517.69
Percent SC 21.3 16.3341
Percent ST 3.5 6.394
Directly employed (2000-03) 22700 22756.61
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Table A4a: State weights in the synthetic ‘treated’ group
State Weight





Dadra & NH 0





















Literacy rate 74.05 76.0972
Number of workers 3063249 3053144
Main workers 2143115 2185583
Marginal workers 920134 867560.7
Cultivators 1762493 1222037
Agricultural laborers 176927 778797.7
Household industrial workers 62483.5 87648.31
Percent SC 21.3 15.9141
Percent ST 3.5 7.5423
Number of factories(2000-03) 612.1667 613.6527
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Table A5a: State weights in the synthetic ‘treated’ group
State Weight





Dadra & NH 0





















Literacy rate 74.05 77.0457
Number of workers 3063249 3012951
Main workers 2143115 2174101
Marginal workers 920134 838849.6
Cultivators 1762493 1265456
Agricultural laborers 176927 514184.3
Household industrial workers 62483.5 99604.07
Percent SC 21.3 16.9639
Percent ST 3.5 3.9131
Total output (2000-03) 580121 579834
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Table A6a: State weights in the synthetic ‘treated’ group
State Weight





Dadra & NH 0.045





















Literacy rate 74.05 76.8581
Number of workers 3063249 3226216
Main workers 2143115 2361348
Marginal workers 920134 864868.4
Cultivators 1762493 1514791
Agricultural laborers 176927 440779.2
Household industrial workers 62483.5 97437
Percent SC 21.3 16.3826
Percent ST 3.5 5.8507
Fixed capital (2000-03) 283296.8 284601.6
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Table A7: Corporate profits and corporate income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (profit) Log (profit) Log (income) Log (income)
post*treat 0.930*** 1.045*** 0.775*** 0.804***
(0.189) (0.244) (0.148) (0.163)
Observations 2,021 2,021 2,404 2,404
R-squared 0.559 0.610 0.582 0.619
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Control group includes all neighboring
states. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-year level. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant
at 10%.
Table A8: Regressions with state×industry fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Log (employed) Log (total factories) Log (total output) Log (fixed capital) Log (wage bill)
post*treat 0.427*** 0.295*** 0.537*** 0.659*** 0.430***
(0.0761) (0.0598) (0.107) (0.131) (0.0786)
Observations 2,567 2,567 2,567 2,567 2,567
R-squared 0.953 0.969 0.939 0.942 0.949
state-industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Control group includes all neighboring








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Treated states: Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh.
Neighboring states: Haryana, Punjab, Delhi, Chandigarh, Uttar Pradesh.
All major states: Neighboring states plus Rajasthan, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattis-
garh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Goa, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Jhark-
hand, Gujarat, West Bengal.
Bordering districts:
Himachal Pradesh Uttarakhand Uttar Pradesh Haryana Punjab
Sirmaur Udham Singh Nagar Pilibhit Yamunanagar Pathankot
Solan Nainital Bareilly Ambala Hoshiarpur
Bilaspur Pauri Rampur Panchkula Rupnagar
Una Haridwar Moradabad - SAS Nagar
Kangra Dehradun Bijnor - Gurdaspur
Chamba - Muzzafarnagar - -
- - Saharanpur - -
